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THE LIABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATORS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSAL FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Susan D. Franck*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the global economy and the increasing number of
international commercial transactions, arbitration has become an important
dispute resolution option. Arbitration is traditionally extolled because it
helps to resolve commercial disputes economically, confidentially, and
finally within a neutral forum.' Additionally, unlike national court
judgments,2 arbitration provides an internationally recognized method for
enforcing awards.' As a result of these benefits,4 arbitration is now the
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1. See GABRIELM. WILKER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIALARBITRATION § 2.01 at 13; see also
William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Quasi-Judicial Immunity Lost by the Arbitrator Who Sat on the
Award: Baar v. Tigerman, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 583, 583 (1985).
2. See William W. Park, Text and Context in International Dispute Resolution, 15 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 191, 194 (1997) (noting that the U.S. is not a party to a single treaty providing for
enforcement of foreign judgments and that even the U.K. has refused to ratify a judgment
treaty with the U.S.).
3. International arbitration awards can be enforced within different countries pursuant to
the New York Convention. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter"New
York Convention"]. Currently, more than 100 countries are signatories to the New York
Convention. See Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments, Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61
ALB. L. REv. 1161, 1161 (1998). This provides a significant benefit to businesses involved
in international disputes because, with the exception of the occasional tax, friendship,
commerce and navigation treaty, there is no international convention for the uniform
enforcement of foreign court judgments. Instead, a country's willingness to enforce the
decision of a foreign court will be determined upon either: (1) the presence of a treaty
between the two countries, or (2) on the basis of international comity. See Russell J.
Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Needfor a Judgments Recognition Convention and What
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preferred dispute resolution mechanism for international commercial
disagreements.5  Unfortunately, because of perceived misconduct by
arbitrators and the risk of party manipulation, the arbitration process has
come under increasing attack through civil actions against arbitrators.
As a result of these concerns, the issue of an arbitrator's immunity has
received increased attention,6 and the scope of arbitrator immunity is
currently a controversial issue.7 Because an arbitrator's potential liability
plays a key role in the effective use of arbitration, commentators have
suggested addressing this issue-but have not yet proposed specific statutory
or regulatory solutions.8 Instead, different countries and arbitral institutions
Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 167, 169, 176 (1998). In the
United States, for example, most states will recognize and enforce foreign money judgments
and approximately 26 states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act which provides that "any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and
enforceable where rendered" is "conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants
or denies the recovery of a sum of money." See id. at 174; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113,220-28 (1895) (providing for the recognitien of foreign courtjudgments based upon the
"comity of nations").
4. See MarkA. Sponseller, RedefiningArbitrallmmunity: A Proposed Qualifiedlmmunity
Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421, 421 n.2 (1993).
5. See THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (Julian E.M. Lew ed., 1990); see also JULIAN
D.M. LEW, Interest on MoneyAwards in InternationalArbitration, in MAKING COMMERCIAL
LAW: ESSAYS N HONOUR OF Roy GOODE 543 (Ross Cranston ed. 1997).
6. See Gerold Hermann, Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on
Arbitration?, 15 ARB. INT'L 221, 225 (1999) (noting that there are emerging tactics of
recalcitrant parties attacking the independence of arbitrators).
7. See Mark W. Levine, The Immunity ofArbitrators and the Duty to Disclose, 6 AM REv.
INT'L ARB. 197, 197 (1995) (stating that "the duties and the legal status of arbitrators have
assumed increased importance"). The International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration, the American Arbitration Association and the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes recently sponsored a Colloquium where speakers addressed the issues
of an arbitrator's duties, liabilities, and immunily. See Upcoming Arbitration Conferences,
6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 148, 148 (1995).
8. In the 1998 Freshfields Arbitration Lecture in London, England, Dr. Gerold Hermann,
primary drafter of the UNCITRAL Model Law, suggested that it might be appropriate to
propose an amendment to the Model Law to expressly deal with the issue of arbitrator and
institutional immunity. Dr. Hermann, however., did not give an express opinion regarding
the proper scope of arbitrator immunity. See Hermann, supra note 6, at 225-26. See also
ALAN REDFERN & MICHAEL HUNTER, LAW AND -PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 270 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that there is no conformity on the proper role of
immunity in different national laws and criticizing that there is "not even a movement for
such conformity amongst those concerned with international commercial arbitrations."); but
see Sponseller, supra note 4, at 443 (suggesting ,qualified immunity for domestic arbitration
matters); see generally Christian Hausmaninger, CivilLiability ofArbitrators-Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 5, 48 (1990) (suggesting a standard of
liability for arbitrators but failing to suggest a statute for national legislatures).
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deal with this issue in a myriad of ways, 9 and even the watershed
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration does not contain any
provision regarding the immunity of arbitrators.1" Ultimately, there is a
startling lack of international harmonization regarding the scope of liability
for international arbitrators.
This Article explores an arbitrator's immunity from liability and
ultimately proposes the proper scope of arbitrator immunity. Part I analyzes
the basis of arbitrator liability. Part II discusses the roots and purposes
behind arbitrator immunity. Part III makes a comparative analysis of
different legal systems' scope of arbitrator liability and immunity. Part IV
addresses which substantive law is applicable to the issue of an arbitrator's
liability. Finally, Part V discusses the proper role of immunity and proposes
a model statute to expressly define the scope of arbitrator liability. This
Article argues that, for international commercial disputes, there should be a
specific standard that recognizes common law, civil law and Islamic law
principles and blends them to harmonize international private law. The
Article concludes that arbitrators should, in general, have broad immunity to
ensure the integrity of the decision- making process. This should, however,
be qualified by statute in certain, limited circumstances where arbitrators (1)
act with intentional, bad-faith conduct, or (2) unjustifiably abandon their
arbitral mandate and fail to render an award. This ultimately strikes a
workable balance between the need for professional accountability towards
parties paying for professional services and maintaining the integrity of
arbitral process.
II. THE BASIS OF ARBITRATOR LIABILITY
A. Types of Liability
The breach of an arbitrator's duty can either be based upon contract or
tort.'1 In general, common, civil, and Islamic law approaches find the source
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law, 18' Session, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985); see infra notes
208-9 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the Model Law and why
it avoided addressing the issue).
11. Regardless of the theory upon which it is based, an arbitrator's liability depends upon
his specific duties and obligations. Mustill and Boyd suggest that when an arbitrator takes
on an appointment, he accepts three principal duties: to take care, to proceed diligently, and
to act impartially. The duty to take care involves an arbitrator performing his responsibilities
with reasonable skill and care. The duty to proceed diligently requires an arbitrator to fulfil
his obligations and act within a reasonable time. Finally, the duty to act impartially involves
2000]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of an arbitrator's obligations in the arbilTation agreement and the contractual
relationship with the parties (the receptum arbitri). There is a divergence,
however, in the willingness to accept that contractual obligations provide the
basis for liability. Traditionally, civil[ law 12 and several Arab countries 3
emphasize the contractual nature of the arbitrator's receptum arbitri and use
this as a baseline for establishing potential liability. In contrast, common law
approaches tend to focus more upon the potentially tortious nature of an
arbitrator's conduct as a violation of a duty of care. 4 Although some cases
suggest that an arbitrator's contractual liability 5 is broader than a
basic fairness to the parties and due process. See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 224-32 (2d ed. 1989);
Tamara Oyre, Professional Liability and Judicial Immunity, 64 ARBITRATION 45, 46 (1998).
Similarly, Redfern and Hunter describe the duties of arbitrators as the duty to act judicially
and the duty of due diligence. See REDEFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 268-70. Butler
& Finsen argue that an arbitrator's duties depend upon the arbitration agreement but
generally include: (1) the duty to take care, (2) the duty to proceed diligently, and (3) the
duty to act impartially. See DAvID BUTLER & EYVIND FINSEN, ARBITRATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: LAW AND PRACTICE, 97-99 (1993).
Whether these duties have legal effect, however, depends upon the law of the
relevant jurisdiction. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 11, at 224 (stating that the "existence
of a moral obligation to perform these duties is undeniable. The question is whether it is
backed by legal sanctions."). In one U.S. case, the court stated that, "the arbitrator has a duty,
expressed or implied, to make a reasonably expeditiously decision." See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v.
Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5' Cir. 1977). Overall, arbitrators
indisputably owe a range of duties to the parties, but the relevant issue is whether the duties
are enforceable when a breach occurs. See Jason Yat-Sen Li, Arbitral Immunity: A
Profession Comes ofAge, 64 ARBITRATION 51, 52 (1998).
12. The receptum arbitri is essentially an arbitrator's agreement to serve as an arbitrator
pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement and creates a contract among the arbitrator and
the parties. See KLAUS P. BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 232 (1993)
(stating that in accepting "expressly or tacitly his mandate the arbitrator enters into a
contractual relationship [the receptum arbitri] with the parties or the arbitral institution).
13. See ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES 348-49
(Lebanon), 430 (Libya), 457 (Morocco), 520 (Qatar), 755 (Yemen) (2d ed. 1999); but
compare id. at 221-22 n. 1 (noting that some commentators suggest that acceptance of the
arbitration mission does not create liability in Iraq, but asserting that any liability should be
based on tort).
14. The nature of the relationship can be described as either contractual, based upon
status, or a combination of these elements. See BUTLER & FINSEN, supra note 11, at 92-95;
see also Grane v. Grane, 493 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Ill. App. 1986) (ignoring that liability
could arise from a contract and instead stating that it is undisputed that an arbitrator's
immunity ... derives from a valid arbitration agreement"); cf Norjarl v. Hyundai, [1991] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 524, 536 (suggesting a contractual basis of liability); cf REDEFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 8, at 267 (suggesting a contractual basis of liability).
15. See Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 985 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); E.C. Ernst,
Inc., 551 F.2d at 1033.
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professional duty of care,16 ultimately, both actions result in potential liability
based upon a breach of duty. 7
1. Contract
Under the contract theory, arbitrators are experts whose liability should
be based upon the terms of their appointment agreement with the parties."i
The precise nature of the contract between the parties and the arbitrators is
not yet settled,19 but even U.S. courts acknowledge that the parties'
arbitration agreement creates the basis of an arbitrator's power and
responsibilities.2"
Arbitrators are free to create their own express contract with the parties
setting out their rights, responsibilities, and liabilities regarding the
arbitration.2 In some countries, primarily Islamic, arbitrators must accept
their appointment in writing;22 but it is unclear whether this "acceptance"
16. See Palacath Ltd. v. Flanagan, [1985] 2 All. E.R. 161, 163. The Myron, [1970] 1
Q.B.527; and Succula Ltd. v. Harland & Wolff, [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 381, help establish
the proposition that an arbitrator has a duty to act judicially, as well as use skill, diligence
and care, regardless of whether the relationship is contractual or not. See also Arthur A.
Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model
Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 47, 76 (1986) (describing the substantial overlap
among liability based upon contract theories, tort theories, and theories based upon a
violation of fiduciary duty).
17. See Arenson v. Casson Beckman Rutley & Co., [1975] 3 All. E.R. 901, 917.
18. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 19.
19. See Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 52 n.9. Redfern & Hunter assert that contract is the
most appropriate legal basis for the relationship. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at
262-66.
20. In Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Ca. 1992), the
court acknowledged that the parties' agreement formed the basis of an arbitrator's authority
but focused more upon that the agreement was more for the invocation of "the arbitrators'
independent judgment and discretion." See Grane, 493 N.E.2d at 1115 (stating that "[i]t is
undisputed that an arbitrator's immunity and authority derives from a valid arbitration
agreement"); see also Boraks v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 517 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Mich.
App. 1994) (noting that the doctrine of immunity "aris[es] from a contractual agreement of
the parties" but stating that "immunity does not depend upon the source of the decision-
making power but rather upon the nature of that power").
21. Under this approach, the liability of an arbitrator is merely a term of the receptum
arbitri to be negotiated between the parties and the potential arbitrator. See Hausmaninger,
supra note 8, at 20.
22. SeeNetherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1029: 26 I.L.M.
921 (1987) (requiring an arbitrator to accept her mandate in writing); SAMIR SALEH,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: A STUDY IN SHARI'A AND STATUTE
LAW 100 (1984) citing Syrian Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 513, at 178 (citing Iraqi Code
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
creates a distinct contract between the parties and the arbitrators.
Unfortunately, as arbitrators do not regularly enter into a separate contract
with the parties for the provision of arbitral services, a different method is
necessary to determine the terms and conditions of the receptum arbitri.
Under a second approach, by consenting to act as an arbitrator, an
individual impliedly becomes a third party to the parties' original arbitration
agreement. For example, the Norjarl v. Hyundai court explained that the
"arbitration agreement is a bilateral contract between the parties to the main
contract. On appointment the arbitrator becomes a third party to the
arbitration agreement which becomes a trilateral contract."23  Another
English court pointed out that arbitrators become parties to the arbitration
agreement by accepting appointments under it.24 At least one South African
court held that when two persons ask a third to arbitrate a dispute between
them, a contractual mandate exists between the disputants and the
arbitrator.25 This perspective is also accepted in some Islamic law countries.
For example, in Lebanon and Yemen, an arbitrator becomes a party to the
agreement to arbitrate and has a contractual relationship with the parties that
of Civil Procedure, Art. 259 (requiring arbitrators to accept and writing and noting that
acceptance is evidence by the arbitrator's signature on the arbitration agreement)) & 201
(citing Egyptian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 503(1) (arbitrator must accept appointment in
writing)).
There are various methods for Islamic law nations of accepting the arbitration
responsibilities: these can either be by expressly requiring acceptance in writing or impliedly
inferring that an individual has accepted. See EL-AIDAB, supra note 13, at 108 (noting that
Bahrain Code of Procedure requires an arbitrator to accept in writing), 300 (noting that the
Kuwait Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure requires an express written acceptance of
the arbitrator), 348-49 (describing how, in Lebanon, the acceptance must be made in writing
pursuant to the civil code but noting a case from the Beirut Appeal Court that states "the
arbitrator's signature of the award he has given shows his acceptance of the mission with
which he was entrusted); 430 (explaining that in Libya the arbitrator must accept in writing
and this can be provided by "the arbitrator's signature on the agreement to arbitrate"); 520
(in Qatar an arbitrator must accept in writing unless appointed by the court); 658 (in Syria
an arbitrator must accept his mission in writing); 689 (same in Tunisia); 249 (noting that
under Jordan law an arbitrator is not required to accept his mission in writing); 457
(explaining how in Morocco an arbitrator does not necessarily accept in writing, but it can
be "deduced from the fact that he has started his mission"). In other countries, such as Oman,
there is no discussion or reference to this issue at all. Id. at 487-90.
23. Norjarl v. Hyundai, (1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 536.
24. Cie Europene de Cereals v. Tradex Export, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 301, 306 (stating
that "[a]ll parties to the arbitration are as a matter of contract bound by the terms of
contract"). Commentators also stress the contractual nature of the relationship between the
parties and the arbitrator. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 11, at 220.
25. BUTLER & FINsEN, supra note 11, at 93 (citing Miller v. Kirsten [1917] TPD 489).
[Vol. 20
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may result in contractual liability. 6
In Ceckolovenska Obeendi Banka v. International Chamber of
Commerce, a French court determined that where parties agreed to submit
their decision to an arbitral institution for resolution, a contract between the
institution and the parties was formed; and this contract included "the duty
to render a decision, in accordance with [the ICC] Rules."27 Essentially, once
arbitrators accept an appointment, they have duties and obligations to both
parties-not merely the party who appointed them. 8 Under this approach,
if an arbitrator breaches an express or implied term of the arbitration
agreement, liability may attach. 9
This contractual approach to liability is usually associated with civil law
countries, and some Islamic countries. In many civil law jurisdictions,
arbitrators are merely professionals whose liability is determined by the
general principles of contractual liability contained within the civil code.3"
This approach usually bases liability on the terms of appointment rather than
the functions an arbitrator performs. Countries such as Italy,3 Austria,3 2 and
26. EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 348, 755.
27. Eric Robine, The Liability of Arbitrators and Arbitral Institutions in International
Arbitrations under French Law, 5 ARB. INT. 323, 324-25 (1989) (citing Ceckolovenska
Obcendi Banka (Cekobank) v. International Chamber of Commerce, REv. ARB. 367 (1987)).
28. See Oyre, supra note 11, at 45 n. 1.
29. See Murray L. Smith, Contractual Obligations Owed by and to Arbitrators: Model
Terms of Appointment, 8 ARB. INT'L 17, 20-24 (1992).
30. See Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 56; see also LEW, supra note 5, at 77 (explaining that
under Spanish law that the civil liability of an arbitrator is based upon the arbitral contract);
PETER SANDERS, National Report on Turkey, in INTERNATIONALHANDBOOKON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 15 (1998) (stating that under Turkish law the relationship between the parties
and arbitrator is "considered to be a mandate, a contract of services, a sui generis contract,
and a contract pertaining to private law").
31. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Italy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Italian Code of Civil Procedure, amended by Law
No. 25 of 5 Jan. 1994, art. 813); see also Maurizio Traverso, The Liability ofArbitrators, 8
INT'L Bus. LAW 339 (1980) (describing that the relationship between the parties and
arbitrator in Italy is contractual and obligates arbitrators to carry out the specific mandate
given to them by the parties in the dispute).
32. In Austria, an arbitrator can be liable to the parties for all damages resulting from a
failure to meet the obligations of terms of appointment. See Austrian Code of Civil
Procedure § 584(2). Moreover, depending upon how the contract is defined, in Austria, any
injured party may claim damages depending upon whether the injurer acted with intent, gross
negligence or negligence. See Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 56. In particular, under the
Austria Civil Law Code, professional liability is covered in art. 1299 where "a person who
claims in public to have knowledge of a function, an art, a trade or a handicraft, or who
accepts without necessity voluntarily an undertaking which requires special skills or
exceptional diligence demonstrates that he believes to possess the necessary diligence and
8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 20
Spain33 have express provisions for liability, while the Netherlands,34
France,35 Poland,36 and Germany have implied ones. In general, however, the
contract between the parties and the arbitrator is subject to private law and
can be characterized as a mandate with service elements or a quasi mandate
in exchange for the remuneration of the arbitrator.37
Although German law contains no express statute creating liability, it
bases arbitrator liability on contract.38 German law implies general terms of
liability.39 However, different types of contracts create different obligations,
so proper categorization of the receptum arbitri is crucial.4" In particular, if
an arbitrator's appointment contract is a mandate41 with service elements, the
the required unusual skills. He is, therefore, liable for their absence."
33. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Spain, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15 (1998) (citing Spanish Code of Civil Procedure, art. 16).
34. In the Netherlands, for example, an arbitrator is held to be in a contractual relationship
with the parties. See LEW, supra note 5, at 60-61. The arbitrator must conduct the case in
accordance with the instructions of the parties and the precise terms of the arbitration
agreement. The precise kind of an arbitrator's contractual obligations are uncertain,
however. See id. at 61; but see Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, Code of Civil
Procedure, art. 1029 (requiring an arbitrator to accept her mandate in writing), art. 1034
(providing arbitrators with a duty to disclose grounds of impartiality), art. 1039 (requiring
the parties to treat the parties "with equality" and allowing each to substantiate his claims
and present the case).
35. In France, if an arbitrator accepts an appointment, there is a meeting of the minds and
a contractual link between the arbitrator and the parties. See Robine, supra note 27, at 323,
327-28; see also LEW, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that the "arbitration convention" is a
contract that makes the arbitrator liable if he fails to abide by his terms of reference).
36. In Poland, Article '750 of the Commercial Code deems the relationship between the
parties and arbitrator to be a contract for services, and the liability of an arbitrator is
governed by that mandate. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Poland, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998); see also arts. 734-51
(explaining the terms of a mandate), arts. 752-64 (management without mandate), arts.
627-50 (contract for works) in THE POLISH CIVIL CODE (1997).
37. BERGER, supra note 12, at 232-34.
38. The Federal Supreme Court of Germany held that the relationship between the parties
and the arbitrator is governed by the arbitration contract. See Haftung des Schiedrichters,
15 BGHZ 12, 14-15 (1954).
39. Under this provision, an obligor is responsible for intentional conduct and negligence.
See Burgerlilches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 276, translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 46
(Simon L. Goren trans., Fred B. Rothman and Co. revised ed. 1994).
40. This is less true of countries like Austria. See LEW, supra note 5, at 18.
41. The contract will probably not be a pure mandate, however, as an arbitrator usually
receives compensation and the mandate provisions of § 662 only apply when an individual
"gratuitously binds self." See BGB § 662, translated in GOREN, supra note 39, at 127.
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arbitrator "is bound to perform the service promised ' 4 2 and is subject to
personal obligations.4 3 If the receptum arbitri is a "contract for works," an
arbitrator would have different obligations." It is probably not a "works"
contract, as these usually involve parties who wish to obtain a specific result,
whereas the results of a service contract are not precisely known before but
result from the obligor's personal effort and skills. The receptum arbitri is
probably a mandatory service contract, and even German arbitration law
discusses arbitral responsibilities in terms of a "mandate."'' 5
For Islamic countries,46 arbitrators also may be bound by the terms of the
parties' arbitration agreement.47 Particularly because of the influence of the
42. See id. at 113, BGB § 611(1).
43. See id. at 128, BGB § 675. Under German law, viewing the contract as mandatory
would put certain obligations on the arbitrator such as: (1) notifying the parties of a refusal
of the mandate, (2) inability to deviate from the instructions of the mandate without notice
and approval of the parties, and (3) other terms regarding the termination of the mandate.
Id. at §§ 663, 665, 670, 674; see also § 664 (noting that a mandatory is also liable for the acts
of his assistants).
44. Idat §§ 631-51.
45. See German Arbitration Law, art. 1038; but see also BUTLER & FINSEN, supra note 11,
at 94 n. 123 (suggesting that under German law the arbitrator acts on the basis of a sui generis
contract between himself and the parties).
46. Under Islamic law, the primary source of law is the Qur'an. Another source is
Mohammed's own legal discussions and sayings from the Sunna, the second source of
Islamic law. Together, these sources form the Shari 'a. The Shari'a services two purposes:
(1) to provide religious ethics to govern religious life, and (2) to outline law that is
recognizable from western, secular standards. See SUSAN E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1-2 (1991). Although many Islamic countries have statutes that
essentially codify the principles embodied in the Qur'an and Shari 'a, there is still room for
interpretation between these two legal sources. See SALEH, supra note 22, at 438 (suggesting
that an outburst of strict application of Shari'a could conceivably upset modern contractual
infrastructure that is unsupported by statute).
47. Traditional Shari'a scholars suggest that an arbitrator should expressly accept his
appointment. But modern jurists tend to assert that the agreement of the parties alone to
execute an arbitration agreement is not sufficient, and instead, the consent of the arbitrator
must be obtained. The Shari'a does not specifically indicate, however, whether this
arbitration agreement must be in writing. See SALEH, supra note 22, at 39-40.
There are some problems, however, with the validity of arbitration agreements for
future disputes. The Shari'a does recognize arbitration as a legitimate, albeit inferior,
dispute resolution mechanism. See SAYED H. AMIN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ISLAMIC
AND IRANIAN LAW 23, 43-44. However, arbitration clauses regarding future disputes are,
in principle, unenforceable. Because such an arbitration agreement would be Gharar
[uncertain], especially in Saudi Arabia, an agreement to arbitrate can only be made after a
dispute arises. See RAYNER, supra note 46, at 366. Although this does not conform with
Shari'a's main tenants, there is a suggestion by legal practitioners that such agreements
would be complied with and respected. See SALEH, supra note 22, at 48-50.
2000]
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civil law tradition on Islamic law,48 it is likely that liability can be based upon
contract. However, because of the strong religious tradition, it is also
necessary to consider the Qur'an and the Shari'a to determine liability.
Although there is no general theory of contract law,49 the Qur'anic saying,
"Fulfill your Obligations," is the fundamental principle that governs
contracts5 ° and could create a basis for arbitrator liability.5" At the same
time, "service contracts [are] of a dubious nature, [and] are also outlawed on
the basis of illegal Mahall [subject matter] and Sabab [motivating cause]."52
Ultimately, however, it is necessary to consult the Qur'an, the Shari 'a, and
the Code of the relevant country before making a final determination.
2. Tort
Arbitrators may also be subject to tort liability resulting from their
professional obligation to perform competently.53 In England, members of
a profession or skilled craft can be held liable for failing to exercise the level
of skill and care normally exercised by persons of that profession. It is
presumed that, "every person who enters into a learned profession undertakes
to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree of skill and care."54
Similarly, in the United States, professionals can be held liable for breach of
their professional duties if they fail to use the reasonable skill and diligence
48. For example, various Islamic codes have imported the western concept of an
irrevocable mandate and could prevent an arbitrator from being removed except through
established court procedures. In contrast, under tradition established in the Shari'a, the
parties' appointment of an arbitrator is revocable any time prior to the delivery of the award.
See SALEH, supra note 22, at 24, 39-44.
49. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 23.
50. See RAYNER, supra note 46, at 87. The Qur'an also states that, "0 ye who believe,
respect your contractual undertakings" and "He authorized what he did not forbid." PETER
SANDERS, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6 (1998).
51. Under the Qur'an, arbitrators are required to judge according to the provisions of the
Qur'an and arbitrate with observance of the rules of fairness and justice. See SALEH, supra
note 22, at 15-16.
52. RAYNER, supra note 46, at 156.
53. In Austern v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, 716 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
the plaintiffs also sued an arbitral institution for the tort of mental anguish, but were barred
by the doctrine of arbitral immunity. See also Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973) (arbitrator in tort action was held immune for quasi-judicial acts).
54. Lanphier v. Phipos, [1838] 8 C&P 475, 479; see also YAT-SEN LI, supra note 11, at
52 (describing the nature of professional liability in England).
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ordinarily exercised by a member of that profession." Arbitrators, like other
professionals, have a duty to behave competently in their capacity as
arbitrators and can be liable for damages resulting from a breach of this
duty.56 In civil law countries, like Germany, it is still possible to be liable for
tortious acts that are not specifically addressed by the receptum arbitri.57
Similarly, although Islamic law does not adhere to the Western categories of
contract and tort, the Qur'an does have a tort-like principle of liability for
arbitrators.5 8 For example, Iraq seems to accept liability based upon tort,5 9
and in Saudi Arabia, "the arbitrator is liable for any fault he commits which
results in damage to any party.
60
B. Types ofArbitrator Misconduct
There are two types of inappropriate behavior by arbitrators: affirmative
misconduct and failure to act. With intentional misconduct, an injured party
who has suffered damage as a result of an arbitrator's conduct has an action
against the arbitrator. In contrast, both parties have actions against an
arbitrator for a failure to act. Since arbitrators owe duties to both parties
once they are appointed, a failure to act damages both parties as it frustrates
the ultimate purpose of arbitration: the rendering of a final award.
1. Misfeasance
Misfeasance involves affirmative actions such as: inappropriate
withdrawal from the arbitration process, fraud, corruption, and bad-faith
actions. Various civil and Islamic law countries expressly provide for
arbitrator liability for premature withdrawal from the arbitration. In
Romania, for example, "arbitrators are liable for damages if. . . after
55. See WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 185-88 (5th ed. 1984); see also City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181
(Minn. 1914) (holding that standards of reasonable care apply to the conduct of professionals
engaged in furnishing skilled services for compensation).
56. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 266.
57. See LEW, supra note 5, at 31.
58. In the Sunna, for example, the Prophet stated that, "[a]ny arbitrator chosen by the
parties who does not deliver justice is cursed by God." See AMIN, supra note 47, at 53; see
also PETER SANDERS, National Report on Saudi Arabia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 17 (1998) (citing KORAN, Al-Nisa (Women) 4:85 (stating "He
that mediates in a good cause shall gain by his mediation; but he that mediates in a bad cause
shall be held accountable for its evil.")).
59. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 221-22.
60. Id. at 585.
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accepting their mandate, they withdraw from it without justification.' In
Libya, if arbitrators withdraw without good reasons, they are liable.62
England and Wales also have a provision providing for arbitrator liability in
the event of unreasonable resignation.63 In the U.S., by contrast, neither
federal nor state laws address the issue for liability for improper withdrawal.
In the Australian case, Road Rejuvenating and Repair Services, there
were several types of affirmative arbitrator misconduct that caused the court
to extend liability.64 Specifically, the arbitrator inappropriately contacted
parties directly, refused to abide by court orders, wrote directly to the judge
and refused to appear in court at the requested time.
65
Usually arbitrators are liable for affirmative conduct taken in bad faith,
but immune for conduct if an arbitrator acts "honestly," "not in bad faith," or
"without fraud., 66 Within the U.S., however, several courts have held that
arbitrators are immune from damages even if they act maliciously, corruptly,
fraudulently, or in bad faith.67 In Jones v. Brown, an arbitrator was immune
61. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Romania, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 18 (1998) (citing Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, art.
353(a)).
62. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Libya, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Libyan Code of Civil Procedure art. 74); see also
PETER SANDERS, National Report on Tunisia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIALARBITRATION (1998) (citing Tunisia Arbitration Code of 1993, art. 11 (stating
that after an arbitrators acceptance, "he may not withdraw without good reason, on penalty
of being liable for damages")); compare PETER SANDERS, National Report on Indonesia, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Indonesia Code
of Civil Procedure, Third Book, Title 1, art. 623 (stating that arbitrators "cannot withdraw
except for reasons to be approved by the Court")).
63. See English Arbitration Act of 1996, § 25.
64. Road Rejuvenating and Repair Servs. v. Mitchell Water Bd.,from Supreme Court of
Victoria, 15 June 1990, reprinted in 1992 ARB. AND Disp. RESOL. L.J. 46, 47.
65. See id.
66. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 11, at 232 (explaining that courts have said an arbitrator
is not liable if he acts "honestly," "not in bad faith," and "without fraud"); see also Penberthy
v. Dymock, [1954] N.Z.L.R. 130, 134 (stating that "an arbitrator is not liable for want of skill
or care, and no misconduct short of bad faith or fraud would render him liable to an action
for damages"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, at 186 (noting that for professional
malpractice, there is no liability if there was an honest mistake ofjudgment where the proper
course of action was open to reasonable doubt).
67. In Ludgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, at 117-18 (9' Cir. 1962) the court held an
arbitrator liable for actions taken in bad faith and with the intent to harm one of the parties.
See also City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'g Co., 120 S.E.2d 564, 567 (N.C. 1961) (stating
that arbitrators are liable for actions taken in bad faith). These cases are potentially
distinguishable, however, as they involve engineers and architects performing quasi-arbitral
functions. See Feichteinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1267 n.4 (Alaska 1995).
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even though he was said to have acted "fraudulently and corruptly" when he
"conspired" with another arbitrator and made a decision without a regular
meeting," without the presence of the third arbitrator, and without the third
arbitrator's signature.6 9 Despite allegations of several types of inappropriate
conduct, the Alaska Supreme Court recently refused to make arbitrators
liable for their bad-faith conduct.70 In another case, an arbitrator was not
liable for "fraudulently inducing, in pursuance of a conspiracy with the
attorney of the other party, the other arbitrator to unite with him in an unjust
award in favor of the latter party."71 Only in Grane did a court find liability
for the fraudulent acts of an arbitrator; and Grane involved the limited
circumstances of an arbitrator's conduct in fraudulently inducing the parties
to enter into the arbitration agreement.72
2. Nonfeasance
In contrast to affirmative misconduct, nonfeasance includes behavior
such as: failure to disclose conflicts of interest, failure to abide by party
requests, failure to abide by the duties imposed by the arbitral rules, 3 failure
to take part in the deliberation process, or failure to render an award. In U.S.
cases, courts regularly extend immunity to arbitrators who fail to disclose a
conflict of interest even though it created an impression of bias and
contaminated the decision-making process.74
68. Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 140, 142-43 (Iowa 1880). Although the arbitrators were
immune from suit, the original award was vacated. Id. at 143. In a subsequent case, they
were not allowed to recover their arbitral fees. See Beaver v. Brown, 9 N.W. 911 (Iowa
1881); see also Hornet v. Godfrey, 3 Luzeme Leg. Reg. R. 10 (Pa. 1883) (holding that the
arbitrator could not collect fees from the parties due to failure to make a timely award).
69. See Beaver, 9 N.W. at 913.
70. See Feichteinger, 893 P.2dat 1267. In particular, allegations of arbitrator misconduct
included such examples as: (1) improperly excluding plaintiff from a hearing, (2) colluding
with a party to deny plaintiff a fair hearing, (3) favoring one party over another, (4) and
fraudulently rendering decisions based on only one party's evidence. See id. at 167 n.1.
71. Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424 (Mass. 1884).
Although the arbitrator had fraudulently induced his co-arbitrators to unite with him in an
award against the plaintiff, the court held that there was as much reason to protect an
arbitrator and insure his impartiality, independence and freedom from undue influences -
and he should receive immunity just as a judge. See id. at 426.
72. See Grane v. Grane, 493 N.E.2d 1112, 1118-19 (Ill. App. 1986).
73. In arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), for example, it is
the duty of the arbitrators to draft the Terms of Reference and succinctly state the issues for
resolution within the arbitration. See ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 18.
74. See, e.g., L&H Airco Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Minn. 1989).
Instead of suits against arbitrators, the court asserted that vacation of the arbitral award was
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
In some countries, arbitrators may also be subject to liability for failing
to abide by the party arbitration agreement or institutional rules." However,
two American courts refused to extend liability to institutions under these
circumstances. First, in Olson v. National Association of Securities
Dealers,76 the arbitral institution failed to follow its own rules regarding the
process of appointing an arbitrator. Second, in Thiele v. RML Realty, even
though an award based upon settlement was founded upon the direction that
it remain confidential, when the arbitral institution improperly released the
award contrary to party direction, the institution was immune.77
Arbitrator misconduct also involves failure to render a timely award. In
Argentina, for example, if arbitrators, withoutjustification, fail to render their
award within the required term, they will, "lose all right to their fees and will
be, furthermore, held liable for costs and damages."78  Similarly, in
Indonesia, arbitrators "are liable to compensate the damages of the parties
should they, without any justifiable reasons fail to make their award within
the period of time fixed for it."7 9 By rendering a late award in the United
States, an arbitrator loses resemblance to a judge and therefore may lose his
claim to immunity.8" However, more recent cases suggest this failure cannot
form the basis of arbitrator liability.8'
the appropriate remedy for the injured party. See id. Similarly, in John Street Leasehold
LLC v. Brunjes, 650 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), where an arbitrator failed to
disclose that he was represented by the opposing party's attorney in a personal matter, the
arbitrator was immune from liability.
75. This type of analysis is akin to the contractual basis for establishing liability. See
supra Part I.A. 1.
76. See Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 383 (8"h Cir. 1996).
77. See Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 416-18 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993). In Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62, 62-63 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973), where
an arbitral institution refused to intervene at a party's request and disqualify an arbitrator,
an arbitrator was found to be immune.
78. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIALARBITRATION (1998) (citing Argentina National Code of Civil and Commercial
Procedure of 1981, arts. 756 & 745 (providing that parties can hold arbitrators "liable for
costs and damages derived from the non-performance of arbitral functions")).
79. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Indonesia Code of Civil Procedure, Third Book,
Title 1, art. 623).
80. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5' Cir.
1977). Similarly, in Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), the court
held the arbitrator liable for damages caused by his failure to render an award. This last
decision was later abrogated by statute. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1297.119.
81. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
Although it adopted the U.S. common law doctrine of immunity, Alaska specifically left
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Because liability for inaction is a more difficult issue, commentators
suggest nonfeasance should be of a sufficiently serious degree8 2 and not
merely, for example, missing a deadline by a few days.83 Others argue that
failure to act should not cause an arbitrator to lose her immunity 4 because
the proper remedy for arbitrator misconduct is vacatur of an award85 or the
failure to award arbitration fees or both.86
II. THE BASIS OF ARBITRATOR IMMUNITY
The immunity of arbitrators from suit is partly based upon the doctrine
of judicial immunity87 and often depends on whether an arbitrator's
responsibilities are functionally comparable to those of ajudge.88 In essence,
although some countries evaluate arbitral immunity on the basis of
open the issue of whether complete failure to render a timely decision results in arbitrator
liability. See Feichtinger v. Conant, 893 P.2d 1266, 1267 n.3 (Alaska 1995).
82. Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 32-34.
83. Professor Nolan further argues that courts should instead focus upon whether delay
is so long as to "demonstrate convincingly that performance is unlikely." Dennis R. Nolan
& Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUST. REL. L.J. 228, 253 (1996).
84. See Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 716 F. Supp. 121, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), (providing an arbitrator with immunity despite a procedural failure to notify one of
the parties of the initiation of arbitral proceedings and stating that the reasoning of Baar v.
Tigerman is "not persuasive").
85. See Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 383 (8 t
h Cir.
1996)(determining that even though the arbitral institution broke its own rules regarding
arbitral appointment, vacatur, and not civil liability, was the proper remedy) and L&H Airco
Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Minn. 1989); see also European Grain &
Shipping, [1983] Q.B. 520 (determining that when an arbitrator failed to participate in
process of rendering an award and merely signed his name on the bottom of a blank award,
vacatur of the award was appropriate). Because of the specific statutory scheme involved,
one court justified arbitral immunity on the basis that there were alternative remedies
available-namely, remedies against trustee/fiduciaries who breached their duties.
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. and
its Locals 656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1187-88 (6t' Cir. 1983).
This remedy is not available in the context of international arbitration.
86. See Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 140, 142-43 (Iowa 1880) and Beaver v. Brown, 9 N.W.
911 (Iowa 1881) (providing arbitrators with immunity but denying them compensation for
their inadequate arbitral services).
87. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (noting that arbitral immunity
conforms to judicial immunity) and LEW, supra note 5, at 44-47 (describing how an
arbitrator's immunity cannot be broader than a judge's).
88. See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (6" Cir. 1982) and
Richard J. Mattera, Has the Expansion ofArbitral Immunity Reached its Limits After United
States v. City of Hayward?, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 779, 780 (1997).
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contractual obligations, others determine the scope of arbitral immunity by
evaluating an arbitrator's similarity in status to judges.89 It is therefore
helpful to examine the roots of judicial immunity.
A. Judicial Immunity
In common law countries, judicial immunity originates from two cases
holding that judges are not liable for their judicial acts.90 This rule of
immunity is subject to two important caveats.9 First, The Marshalsea Case
held that actions taken in complete absence of jurisdiction can subject a
judge to personal liability.9" Second, Floyd v. Barker determined that ajudge
can only be immune for "judicial actions" rather than acts that are
administrative, legislative, or personal.93
In Bradley v. Fisher,94 the U.S. Supreme Court provided federal judges
with immunity. The Court reasoned that because of the need for the proper
and efficient administration of justice, a judge "cannot be subjected to
responsibility for [a decision] in a civil action, however erroneous the act
may have been, and however injurious the consequences it may have proved
to the plaintiff.,9 5 Despite a vigorous dissent96 and allegations of deliberate,
malicious and wilful misconduct, the Court held that a judge was immune
because he had not acted in excess of his subject matter jurisdiction.97
Similarly, in Pierson v. Ray, the Court granted immunity to ajudge allegedly
engaged in malicious actions. 98 In justifying this grant of immunity, these
89. There is a sense that the issue is evaluated from two radically different perspectives:
one on the contractual basis of liability and the other upon immunity based upon the
functional similarity to a judge. BUTLER & FINSEN, supra note 11, at 92-97.
90. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, at 1056-59.
91. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 83, at 230.
92. The Marshalsea Case, 10 Coke's Kings Bench Rep. 68, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.
1612); see also Michael R. King, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal
for Limited Liability, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 549, 553 (1978).
93. Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke's Kings Bench Reports 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
In Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988), a federal judge was held not to have
immunity for his decisions to hire and fire an employee as the court determined these actions
were administrative in nature.
94. 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
95. Id. at 346-47.
96. See id. at 357 (asserting that a judge should be liable if he acts maliciously and
corruptly).
97. See id.
98. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 537 (1967), involved allegations of inappropriate conduct of
a judge in convicting civil rights protestors for their lawful actions in a Jackson, Mississippi
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two cases focused upon the availability of alternative remedies such as
impeachment99 and the possibility of appeal. 100 The availability of appellate
error correction is central to the justification of judicial immunity since,
without the possibility for correcting errors, litigants would be justified in
using collateral attacks to redress errors of justice. °1
Butz v. Economou clarified that the basis of immunity depends upon
whether the functions performed are judicial in nature. 0 2 Stump v.
Sparkman"°3 explained that whether a judge's actions are "judicial" and
immune from liability depends on (1) "whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge," and (2) "whether [the parties] dealt with the judge in
his judicial capacity."1
0 4
Despite this broad immunity, there are areas of liability. Specifically,
judges are not immune from criminal prosecutions and impeachment from
office.'0 5 Despite these somewhat limited exclusions, however, judicial
immunity in common law countries is nearly absolute. 106
In civil law jurisdictions, "there is no concept of an absolute immunity
of the judiciary for judicial acts."'0 7 In general, judges can be liable for all
wrongful acts and parties to a judicial proceeding can recover damages
bus station.
99. In Bradley, the Court focused upon the availability of remedies such as impeachment,
suspension, or removal from office. See 80 U.S. at 350.
100. The Pierson court focused nearly exclusively on the fact that a judge's "errors may
be corrected on appeal." See 386 U.S. at 553-54.
101. See Andrea Mettler, Immunity v. Liability in ArbitralAdjudication, 47 ARB. J. 24, 25
(1992) and Chaykin, supra note 16, at 78-79. Originally, in England, immunity was
developed to eliminate collateral attacks on judgments and confine error correction to the
hierarchy within the King's courts. Judicial immunity followed from the doctrine of sanctity
of records but was welcomed largely because it strengthened the appellate system by cutting
off collateral attacks on judgments. See Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of
Judicial Immunity, 5 DuKE L.J. 879, 881, 922-24.
102. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (stating that immunity "stems from
the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location").
103. 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (holding that because the judge performed an act normally
performed only by judges and had acted in his capacity as a judge, he was immune from
liability).
104. Id. at 362-63. Judges in the U.S. are not immune when they act in an administrative
function. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
105. See Mettler, supra note 101, at 782-83 and Nolan & Abrams, supra note 83, at 232.
106. In the United Kingdom, judges also enjoy an absolute immunity from any form of
civil action being brought for their judicial acts. See Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, [ 1974] App. Cas.
727, 757-58.
107. Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 13 (emphasis in original).
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caused by judicial wrongdoing. °8 In Argentina, for example, judges are
liable for damage and loss resulting from tortious conduct that occurs in the
exercise oftheirjudicial functions." 9 Similarly, in Spain, judges do not enjoy
absolute immunity for acts in the course of official conduct; instead, Spanish
law expressly provides that judges might be liable for "inexcusable
negligence or ignorance."'11 In the Netherlands, liability of judges occurs
only if (1) the judge's actions involved "a negligence of fundamental legal
principles", (2) a party was deprived of fair and impartial treatment, and (3)
there are no other remedies available to rectify the damage."' Because this
rule can virtually never be applied, one commentator suggests that the Dutch
law ofjudicial immunity is very similar to the absolute immunity of the U.S.
and England. 1
2
Although South Africa tends toward the common law, a civil law
influence still exists. Interestingly, a judge is generally immune for his
judicial actions and cannot be held liable for lack of care or skill in the
course of judicial duties." 3 There is still, however, a small possibility for
liability pursuant to the Supreme Court Act of 1959 which provides that a
summons may be issued against a judge with the consent of the court."4
Although the precise scope of judicial immunity varies from country to
country, common law countries generally tend to provide more protection to
judges for their judicial acts.
B. Arbitral Immunity: The Extension of Judicial Immunity?
1. Arbitrators
Some commentators advocate extending immunity to arbitrators because
of the quasi-judicial nature of the actions they perform and the need to
protect the independence of those acts." 5 In essence, rather than focusing
upon the terms of an arbitrator's appointment to establish the scope of
liability, the limitation of liability is justified because of an arbitrator's status
and functional similarity to judges. Particularly within common law
108. See id.; see, e.g., LEW, supra note 5.
109. See LEW, supra note 5, at 5.
110. See id. at 72-73.
111. See id. at 60.
112. See id.
113. See BUTLER & FINsEN, supra note 11, at 100-101.
114. Seeid. at n.178.
115. See, e.g., DOMKE, supra note 1, at § 23.01.
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jurisdictions, courts appear willing to extend immunity to arbitrators when
they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity 16 since "arbitrators are in much
the same position as judges, in that they carry out more or less the same
functions."117 As with the Administrative Law Judges who gained immunity
in Butz, individuals trying to make principled decisions should be immune
from suit because of the "special nature of their responsibilities." '18
In the United States, when arbitrators assume responsibilities that are
functionally comparable to those ofjudges, they receive immunity. 19 As one
respected commentator explained, functional similarity to a judge depends
upon "(i) whether a dispute exists, (ii) whether there is an ultimate
determination of liability, and (iii) whether the decision-maker conducts a
hearing and takes evidence from the parties, as would a judge.""12
In Hutchins v. Merrill,"1 for example, although he acted as a log
appraiser, the arbitrator was immune. The court found he exercised ajudicial
function because, "the proper discharge of the duties of the scaler involves
the exercise of skill and judgment, as well as absolute impartiality on his
part, and of the mutual agreement of the parties that... this scale should be
116. When deciding whether to extend quasi-judicial immunity, one important prerequisite
is whether the individual truly acts with a judicial function. See City of Durham v. Reidsville
Eng'g Co., 120 S.E.2d 564 (N.C. 1961) (extending immunity to engineers); Blecick v. School
Dist. No. 18, 406 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (extending immunity to architects);
Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (extending immunity to mediator
and case evaluator acting in court-related program); see also Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428
N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to guardians ad litem);
ef Craviolini v. Scholer & Fuller Assoc. Architects, 357 P.2d 611 (Ariz. 1960) (failing to
extend immunity to architects who were not acting in an arbitral capacity); Gammel v. Ernst
& Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1955) (determining that certified accountants were not
entitled to immunity where they were not acting in a quasi-judicial, decision-making
capacity).
117. Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, [1974] App. Cas. 727, 735.
118. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978). Employees of administrative agencies
who work as judges (ALJs) are immune from liability because they perform quasi-judicial
functions. See id. at 511, 513-14. Unlike arbitrators, however, ALJs are subject to de novo
review for questions of law, and questions of fact are reviewed under the substantial
evidence test. See Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951) and Brickner v.
FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198, n.4 (8' Cir. 1984). Ultimately, ALJs are subject to greater scrutiny
and have a more involved appellate review.
119. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 16 and Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d
1205, 1209 (6t' Cir. 1982). As the Corey court clearly articulated, arbitrators are judges
chosen by the parties to decide matters submitted to them; and by this private agreement, the
parties invoke the arbitrators' independentjudgment and discretion as a decision-maker. See
Corey at 1209.
120. Park, supra note 2, at 206-7.
121. 84 A. 412 (Me. 1912).
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final and conclusive."' 22 In Austern, even though the hearing took place
without the plaintiff's presence or knowledge, 23 the court assumed that the
act of holding hearings and rendering a final decision was sufficiently
"judicial" to justify immunity. 1
24
In contrast, there is no entitlement to immunity when there is no
underlying dispute and the misconduct is unrelated to the defendant's
decision-making capabilities. 125 In Baar v. Tigerman ("Barr i/,),126 an
arbitrator was held liable because he failed to render a decision within the
time prescribed by the arbitration agreement. Although it focused more upon
the contractual obligations of the arbitrator, Baar H nevertheless held that
there were significant differences between judicial actions 27  and
arbitrators, 28 and that the significant delay could not be deemed functionally
equivalent. 129 Unfortunately, the precedential value of Baar II has been
122. Id. at 413.
123. Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 884 (2 d Cir. 1990)
[hereinafterAustern I1]. Although the plaintiffs had an arbitration agreement which required
them to be notified of the beginning of any arbitration proceedings, they were never notified
of the initiation.
124. Id. In another case, a labor arbitrator was immune from suit because when he broke
a deadlock between trustees he was "functionally comparable" a judge in that he had no
interest in the outcome of the conflict and he was acting according to his mandate to break
the deadlock. See generally International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric.
Implement Workers of Amer. and its Locals 656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d
1181 (6' Cir. 1983).
125. Craviolini, 357 P.2d at 613-14.
126. Baarv. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834,836-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) [hereinafterBaar
I/].
127. Baar II did focus upon the fact that in California there are several ways to address
arbitrator non-feasance. First, a judge is required to swear that no cases remain undecided
for more than 90 days before they get their salaries. Second, judges are subject to
impeachment. Third, judges may be censured or removed under certain circumstances
including "persistent failure or inability to perform [a] judge's duties." Id. at 837 n.7.
128. Essentially, this involved a general policy-based distinction where the court
distinguished the cases by arguing that: (1) ajudge receives a mandate from the government,
(2) the judiciary is essential to preserving democracy, (3) trials are public, (4) judges must
follow the law, (5) arbitral decisions have little precedential value, (6) arbitration cannot
affect third party rights, and (7) judges cannot decline to take a case within the court's
jurisdiction. See id. at 837-38.
129. Interestingly, in discussing the Baar case, the General Counsel of the American
Arbitration Association explained that the arbitrator was a "former bar association president
who was experiencing personal difficulties" at the time he was being condemned for
excessive delay. Michael F. Hoellering, The Role of the International Arbitrator, 51 SEPT.
Disp. RESOL. J. 100, 106 (1996). This aspect was not discussed by the Baar court. Other
jurisdictions do consider whether delay is justified in determining whether to extend
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questioned.1"°In England,"' an arbitrator is immune when acting in a
"judicial capacity" or performing functions "sufficiently judicial in
character."132 English law explains that indicia ofjudicial functions include:
"(1) the existence of a dispute; (2) the submission of the dispute by
agreement of the parties, or unilaterally, for binding decision; (3) the hearing
of evidence and arguments by the parties; (4) making an unbiased decision
fairly between the parties." 133 In Arenson, Lord Simon stressed that "the
essential prerequisite for [the arbitrator] to claim immunity is that, by the
time the matter is submitted to him for decision, there should be a formulated
immunity. See supra notes 61 & 78 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 272-75 and
accompanying text.
In E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1033-35 (5 h
Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), an arbitrator was sued
for failing and delaying in making decisions. In this case, the court held that, "[w]here his
action, or inaction, can fairly be characterized as delay or failure to decide rather than timely
decision-making (good or bad), he loses his resemblance to ajudge. He has simply defaulted
on a contractual duty to both parties." Id. at 1033.
130. See Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 716 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 971 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
131. Although these cases refer to the common-law approach of an arbitrator's functional
comparability to a judge in order to determine the scope of immunity, the precise scope of
arbitral immunity has been clarified, however, by the 1996 Arbitration Act.
Also, in Australia, the important basis for providing immunity is whether the
individual has a judicial function and is engaged in an exercise with a significant judicial
element. Thomas Cooke. v. Commonwealth Banking Corp., [1986] 4 BPR 9185, 1986 NSW
LEXIS 7181, * 14-22. In a recent case, however, an arbitrator was required to indemnify and
arbitral institutions when the arbitrator engaged in repeated, improper conduct. See Road
Rejuvenating and Repair Services, [1992] ARB. &DISPUTE RESOLUTION L. J. 47. Although
there is no analysis of whether his bad-faith conduct was sufficient "judicial" to warrant
immunity, he was found liable nonetheless. See also Gas & Fuel Corp. of Victoria v. Wood
Hall Ltd, [1978] V.R. 385, 411 (determining that removal of an arbitrator was appropriate
where an arbitrator had engaged in the "non-judicial" activities of (1) making a decision
while being "insufficiently informed about all the facts and circumstances of the case," (2)
describing counsel as "wasting time", and (3) attempting to decide the case unnecessarily in
advance); but see PETER SANDERS, National Report on Australia, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Victoria Commercial Arbitration
Act of 1984 § 52). Stating that an arbitrator "is not liable for negligence in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done by the arbitration... in the capacity of arbitration... but
is liable for fraud in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in that capacity") and
Australia International Arbitration Act of 1984, § 28 (stating that an arbitrator "is not liable
for negligence in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in the capacity of arbitrator,
but is liable for fraud in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in that capacity").
The Australia International Arbitration Act was amended in 1989 to bring it in conformity
with the UNCITRAL Model Law. See LEW, supra note 5, at 14.
132. Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, [1974] App. Cas. 727, 738.
133. Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 54 (citing Sutcliffe and Arenson v. Casson).
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dispute between at least two parties which his decision is required to
resolve." '134
Under New Zealand case law, arbitrators are also immune if they act
with a judicial function."' In the leading case, Pickins v. Templeton,136 the
High Court of Christchurch determined that, although the Arbitration Act of
1908 technically classified the valuer as an arbitrator, his actions were not
sufficiently judicial to justify immunity. 37 In making this determination, the
Court focused upon the fact that the "arbitrator's" role was "essentially to
investigate the value of the assets." Because this was based upon the
arbitrator's personal "knowledge, expertise and experience in the field" and
was followed by a negotiation between the arbitrators and a third "umpire"
who "had to make the final decision," the acts of the arbitrator/valuer were
not judicial. 138 Because the "arbitrator" used personal knowledge and did not
make an ultimate determination, the acts were not sufficiently "judicial" to
warrant immunity.
Canada has a similar approach. In Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer,139 the
Canadian Supreme Court held that immunity would only attach where the
precise function of the arbitrator was judicial. The court focused on the
status of an arbitrator and her similarity to a judge to determine whether an
134. Arenson v. Casson, 3 All. E.R. at 912 (1975).
135. See Pickens v. Templeton, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 718. This position may have been
changed by the new Arbitration Act. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on New Zealand,
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing New Zealand
Arbitration act of 1996, § 13).
136. [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 718. There is an older case from New Zealand, Penberthy v.
Dymock, [1954] N.Z.L.R. 130, which the Pickens case cast significant doubt upon. See
Pickens 2 N.Z.LR. at 727 (stating that there have been "very substantial developments in the
law [since 1954 and]... it is no longer possible to say that simply because someone acts as
an arbitrator they are entitled to immunity from civil suit whatever their actual function.").
Although the arbitrators in that case merely valued shares, the court determined they were
not liable for lack of skill and care since the court felt they were not "valuers strictly."
Penberthy, [ 1954] N.Z.L.R. at 134-35. Even the Penberthy court provided that an arbitrator
might be liable for conduct involving bad faith or fraud. See id. at 134.
137. See Pickens, [ 1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 728. The Pickens court set up a helpful continuum
to examine the extent of judicial content, stating that, "At one end of the scale is the
arbitrator who sits to hear evidence and submissions and then adjudicates in the same way
as a Judge. At the other end is the arbitrator who is appointed to use his own expertise, skill
and care to investigate a particular matter and to come to a decision on it without evidence,
submissions or any type of hearing." Id. at 728.
138. Id. The court did focus upon the fact that it was the umpire who ultimately made the
final decision and, in a sense, adjudicated the figures adopted by the two arbitrators. Id. The
court did not address whether this third "umpire" could be immune.
139. Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer [1988] 1 S.C.R. 564, 38 Bus. L. REP. 221 (1988).
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individual was immune. The Supreme Court indicated that the test for
whether an arbitrator should be immune is: (1) the existence of a dispute, and
(2) the duty or intent of the parties to submit the dispute to an arbitrator.14 °
In evaluating whether an individual is an arbitrator, Canadian courts
consider: (1) the language of the parties in labeling the function the third
party performs, (2) the similarity between the arbitrator and the judicial
process and whether the parties "have the right to be heard, to argue, to
present testimonial or documentary evidence, that lawyers are present at the
hearing and that the third party delivers an arbitral award with reasons," (3)
whether the decision is final and binding, and (4) whether the arbitrator must
decide between opposing arguments or render something akin to an expert
opinion based on personal experience.141
These cases demonstrate that under the common law approach, an
arbitrator deserves immunity when an actual dispute exists; the arbitrator
must decide between opposing arguments; there are hearings and
presentation of evidence; the individual is impartial; and the decision is final
and binding upon the parties.
Arbitrators, however, are not judges.'42 Because there are several key
distinctions between the roles played by arbitrators and judges, the functional
analogy between arbitrators and judges eventually breaks down. First,judges
derive their power and remuneration from the state while arbitrators derive
their power from private contracts and receive payment from the parties in
exchange for professional services. 143 Because of its relation to the state, the
judiciary is "essential to the preservation of democracy." 144  Although
arbitration is an important commercial service, its role is, perhaps, less
"noble. 145  Second, judges are required to follow the law and judicial
decisions have critical precedential consequences. In contrast, arbitrators are
140. See Sport Maska, 38 Bus. L. REP. at 284. Interestingly, in its analysis of French law
on immunity, the Sport Maska court found that French law has a similar two-pronged
analysis. Id. at 291. Ultimately, the court concluded that there is "no fundamental difference
between the approaches taken by the common law and that taken by French case law and
academic analysis." Id. at 291; but see LEW, supra note 5, at 34-35 (suggesting that an
arbitrator's liability in France is based upon contract but noting that if an arbitrator is
exercising a "jurisdictional function" that arises from "the very contents of the final and
binding decision" an arbitrator should be free from all liability).
141. See id. at 301-2.
142. See BUTLER& FINSEN, supra note 11, at 95-97, for a general discussion of the major
differences between judges and arbitrators in South Africa.
143. See Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 984 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Arenson v.
Casson, [1975] 3 All. E.R. at 918-19.
144. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984.
145. See Sponseller, supra note 4, at 430.
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not necessarily bound by precedent, 46 nor do they create it. 147 Third, trials
are public, while arbitration involves private and often confidential dispute
resolution. 48 Fourth, unlike a court proceeding, arbitration cannot determine
the rights and obligations of non-parties to the arbitration contract and cannot
decide any questions not presented by the parties' submission. 149
Additionally, arbitration lacks other procedural formalities such as strict rules
of evidence and requirement of a transcript. 50 Finally, arbitral awards are
subject to a very limited judicial review.' 5 ' This is an important distinction
given that the availability of appellate review of judge's decisions is
fundamental to judicial immunity. Therefore, despite this "functional"
similarity, legislatures and courts should be cautious about extending
immunity to arbitrators without also considering the contractual agreement
underlying the arbitrator's authority and the proper balance of public policy
concerns.
146. For example, under the ICC, UNCITRAL and LCIA Rules, arbitrators have the
authority to decide cases as amiables compositeurs or ex aequo et bono. See International
Chamber of Commerce Rules on International Arbitration, as in effect 1/1/98, art. 17.3;
London Court of International Arbitration Rules on International Arbitration as in effect
1/1/98, art. 22.4; UNCITRAL Rules on International Arbitration, adopted by U.N. General
Assembly on 15 Dec. 1976, art. 33(2). Under these doctrines, arbitrators are not bound to
apply specific rules of law, and instead have the authority to decide on the basis of general
principles of law or as equity and justice require. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703 (1999); but
see Gas & Fuel Corp. of Victoria v. Wood Hall Ltd, [1978] V.R. 385, 394. Most countries
provide that arbitrators may only act as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono if the
parties expressly authorize it. English Arbitration Act; PETER SANDERS, National Report
on Peru, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing
Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 117); French Code of Civil Procedure; Swiss Code
of Civil Procedure. However, in certain South American Countries, as a default, arbitrators
have the authority to decide as amiable compositeurs. See PETER SANDERS, National Report
on Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing
Argentine Code of Civil Procedure, art. 766) and PETER SANDERS, National Report on
Columbia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing
Columbia Decree No. 2279, amended by law No. 23 of 21 Mar., 1991, art. 51).
147. See Singer v. Flying Tiger Line Inc., 652 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9 Cir. 1981); Baar, 140
Cal. App. 3d at 984; andArenson, [1975] 3 All. E.R. at 918.
148. See Baar, 140 Cal. App.3d at 984.
149. See id.
150. See Mattera, supra note 88, at 785 and Sponseller, supra note 4, at 436-37.
151. See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1210 (6 h Cir. 1982).
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2. Arbitral Institutions
Various courts have held that immunity should extend to institutions that
sponsor arbitration. 152 These courts then have focused upon the need to
effectuate policies that underlay arbitral immunity. 153 Without this immunity,
American courts assert that arbitrator immunity would be meaningless
because liability would merely shift from individual arbitrators to the
sponsoring organization.'54
A minority of cases hold arbitral institutions liable. Baar v. Tigerman,
for example, held a sponsoring organization liable.' The court based its
reasoning on the fact that organizations derive their immunity from the
arbitrator and the AAA did not act in an "arbitral capacity" when it failed to
oversee the arbitration.'56 One Australian case also stands in stark contrast to
the vast majority of U.S. cases. In Road Rejuvenating and Repair Services,
the Supreme Court of Victoria held that an arbitral institution was liable for
the misconduct of its arbitrator. "' Because the court was concerned that the
arbitrator was biased through its "inexcusable alignment of the arbitrator,"'
58
it ordered the removal of the arbitrator at the institution's expense.
The basis of institutional immunity is somewhat different. It is not the
institution's functional comparability to a judge, but rather, whether its
actions are necessary to give effect to the arbitral process. 159 In essence,
arbitral immunity protects all acts within the scope ,of administering the
arbitral process. As another court put it, arbitral immunity protects
152. See Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
153. See id.
154. See Olson v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 382 (8"h Cir. 1996);
Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2"d Cir. 1990); and Corey 691
F.2d at, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
155. See Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
156. See id.
157. Road Rejuvenating and Repair Servs, 1992 ARB. & DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 47. In that
case, the court complained of several acts, including: (1) the improper admission of legally
privileged documents, (2) repeated ex parte communications with one party, (3) refusal to
abide by a court order, (4) writing directly to a judge and refusing to appear in court. Id. In
justifying the breadth of this immunity, the court stated that, "the Board should have known
and its officers should have been instructed that they should not communicate directly with
the arbitrator or allow him to communicate directly with them." Id.
158. Id.
159. See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211.
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arbitrators and their organizations for all actions performed in their arbitral
capacity. 6 °
Most courts extend immunity to institutions because they act in a quasi-
judicial function as a quasi-judicial organization. For example, in
Rubenstein, the court held that an institution and one of its officers' were
immune from liability.'62 Ultimately, the court based its extension of
immunity on the basis that both the institution and its vice president were "in
effect quasi-judicial organizations."' 63 In a similar case, despite allegations
that the AAA had misrepresented the effectiveness of its arbitration services
and breached its duty to provide competent arbitrators, the court held the
institution immune.164
Other courts bring institutions within the umbrella of immunity because
they perform acts that are necessary extensions and sufficiently related to the
arbitral process that ensure the policies behind immunity are fulfilled.
65
Various cases elucidate what it means to be sufficiently related to the arbitral
process. Appointment of the arbitrator is worthy of immunity because it is
a necessary function of the administration and directly connected to the
arbitral process. 66  Even though in one case it spoiled evidence, the
institution's administrative control of the arbitral proceeding was sufficient
to warrant immunity.1 67 Improper notice and scheduling of hearings is also
sufficiently related to adjudication to justify immunity. 68 Other types of
160. See Wally v. General Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Indus., 630
N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1995).
161. The organization's Vice President was also immune even though he had "knowledge
of all the facts." Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
162. In this case, one party asked the chairman to disqualify himself because of his
previous professional relationships with the opposing party. See id.
163. Id. at 64.
164. See Boraks v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 517 N.W.2d 771,773 (Mich. App. 1994).
The Boraks court reasoned that arbitral immunity extends to quasi-judicial bodies that
sponsor arbitrations and make arbitration facilities available because they are natural and
necessary extensions of arbitrator immunity. Id. at 772.
165. See Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
166. See Olson v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 383 (8 ' Cir. 1996) and
Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2 d Cir. 1990).
167. Cort v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Interestingly, the result here might be different under Arab law. With traditional Islamic law
principles, institutions can be liable for failing to take note of important documents, or losing
or damaging them. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 17 (1998).
168. The court in Austern I assumed that the CBOE arbitration rules were included in the
terms of the arbitration agreement. It was these rules that the institution broke that was the
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irregularities such as inability to present evidence and the postponement of
hearings without notice have also garnered immunity.169
One feature common to these cases is that when institutions break their
own rules and fail to abide by the arbitration agreement, they still receive
immunity.1 70 For example, in Thiele, the parties arrived at a negotiated award
and asked the institution to keep the award confidentialY.17  Although the
institution had agreed, it ultimately released the award contrary to the parties'
agreement. In justifying the extension of immunity, the Thiele court argued
that sending out an award is not an administrative act, but is rather "as much
a part of the arbitral process as is determining the award."'72 This broad
construction of functions that are "integrally related" to the arbitral process
creates a very broad scope of immunity for arbitral institutions.
Although protecting the policies underlying immunity and avoiding a
shift of blame is certainly a worthy goal, it is a matter of concern that
agencies disregard their own stated rules-rules that the parties probably
considered when deciding with which institution to work. In a dispute
resolution mechanism that supposedly values party autonomy and freedom
of choice, it is quite ironic that institutions are insulated from their failure to
adhere to the parties' agreement.
Even United States government agencies are subject to criticism under
the Administrative Procedure Act for failing to follow their own rules.'73
alleged cause of the plaintiff's damage. See Austern, 898 F.2d at 884-86.
169. See Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6h Cir. 1982). There was
a sense, however, that because the arbitrators were immune for their inappropriate acts, the
NYSE was merely acting through its immune agents, and should therefore be granted
immunity. See id. at 1209. Other cases demonstrate that there is a sense that institutions are
vicariously liable for the torts of arbitrators appointed pursuant to their rules. See Baar v.
Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
170. See Olson, 85 F.3d at 383; Austern, 898 F.2d at 886; and Corey, 691 F.2d at 1208.
171. See Thiele, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417-18. Interestingly, the court decided to extend this
immunity to institutions despite the fact that: (1) the new California legislation expressly
providing international arbitrators with immunity did not refer to arbitral institutions, and (2)
a provision extending immunity to sponsoring organizations was recommended to the
Legislature but was rejected. See id. at 416.
172. Id. at 419.
173. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also William Funk, Supreme Court News, 22 ADMIN.
& REG. L. NEWS 3 (1997) (stating that "it is hornbook law that an agency's unexplained
departure from settled policy is arbitrary and capricious."); INS v. Yang, 117 S. Ct. 350
(1996) (acknowledging that if an agency "announces and follows-by rule or by settled
course of adjudication-a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed,
an irrational departure from the policy.., could constitute action that must be overturned as
'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion ' within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act."); and James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the
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Unlike arbitration with its limited rights to appeal, under the APA, this type
of arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion behavior can result in reversal
upon appeal. Moreover, in France, arbitration centers are required to adhere
to the rules applicable to the arbitration'74 and are potentially liable for their
failure to adhere to the parties' arbitration agreement.
175
Ultimately, arbitration agencies should not necessarily be completely
free to disregard their own rules and the parties' arbitration agreement.
However, they perform a key function as a quasi-judicial organization that
allows arbitrators to function effectively and ensure that the arbitration comes
to fruition. In order to avoid blanket protection without providing a reasoned
analysis, courts and legislatures should properly balance these competing
concerns.
C. Policy-Based Justifications for Arbitral Immunity
Courts often justify extending judicial immunity to arbitrators because
of public policy.176 One of the primary reasons for extending immunity is the
concern for the independence and integrity of the decision-making process.
The fear is that if arbitrators, unlike judges, are liable: (1) unhappy parties
might threaten or harass arbitrators, 77 or (2) arbitrators might not make
principled decisions if they are concerned about being sued and reprisals
from dissatisfied litigants. 178 In other words, without immunity, the integrity
of the judicial process will be sacrificed because normally diligent arbitrators
will be intimidated by the possibility of dissatisfied parties bringing
lawsuits. 79
A second argument is that immunity helps ensure the finality of arbitral
awards. 8° Without immunity, an unsuccessful party could re-litigate a case
United Kingdom, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 131, 165 (1991) (describing that within the United
Kingdom, the Securities and Investment Board cannot fail to follow its own rules).
174. See Robine, supra note 27, at 328-29.
175. See Soci&6t Cubic Defense Sys. v. Chamber de Commerce Internationale, 1997 REv.
ARB. 417.
176. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-11 (1978).
177. See Sutcliffe v. Thackrah, [1974] App. Cas. 727, 757.
178. See id. at 736; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 537, 547 (1967).
179. See Cort, 795 F. Supp. at 970 (determining that in order to encourage independent
judgments, the arbitration process is granted immunity because functional comparability of
arbitrator's decision-making process since immunity furthers need to be free from threat of
lawsuits for independent decisions).
180. See Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 53 and REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at
266-67.
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by attacking the arbitrator and vitiate one of the primary advantages of
arbitration. Even the Departmental Advisory Committee drafting of the 1996
English Arbitration Act stated that it felt "strongly that unless a degree of
immunity is afforded, the finality of the arbitral process could well be
undermined."' 81
A third reason for extending immunity is that without it, the number of
skilled persons prepared to act as arbitrators would be significantly
reduced.182 The idea is that the threat of liability deters responsible and
capable individuals from accepting posts and that it thus would be difficult
to find skilled persons prepared to serve as arbitrators.'83
Some argue that imposing liability184 for negligence and wilful
misconduct will not cause people to leave the profession. 85 Instead, because
arbitration has become a profession, potential liability merely increases the
quality of services provided. Moreover, it is "one of the marks of a fully
developed profession that its members undertake to accept personal
responsibility to those whom they serve, including full legal liability for loss
caused by any failure." '86  Therefore, if arbitration really wishes to be
recognized as a legitimate profession, arbitrators must accept professional
liability. 187
Finally, immunity can also be justified on the basis of the protection of
the public. For example, in Pickens v. Templeton, a New Zealand court
focused upon the fact that arbitration exists not for arbitrators, "but for the
protection of the public in cases in which truly judicial functions are being
181. Oyre, supra note 11, at 48 (citing Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration
Report on the Arbitration Bill at 32 (February 1996)).
182. See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778,780-81 (7t' Cir. 1977) and REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 8, at 266.
183. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 11. Although it may drive up fiscal costs of an
arbitrator's practice, malpractice insurance is often available.
184. One commentator even suggests that removal of immunity, like that of other
professional liability actions, is not likely to spur suits against arbitrators. See Andrew I.
Okekeifere, The Parties'Rights Against a Dilatory or Unskilled Arbitrator: Possible New
Approaches, 15 J. INT. ARB. 129, 139-40 (1998).
185. For example, Sponseller notes that arbitration is becoming a profession with "for
profit" arbitration firms and established degrees in ADR. He further notes that "while
imposing potential liability may speed this professionalization by increasing the need for
malpractice insurance, increased professionalism and accountability is not an undesirable
outcome." Sponseller, supra note 4, at 438.
186. Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 55.
187. See Okekeifere, supra note 184, at 140 (citing Arenson v. Casson, [ 1975] 3 All. E.R.
901, 918, 927).
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discharged."'88 In essence, by providing a private service and a means to
unburden crowded court dockets, the public receives a benefit-and the
integrity of this benefit must be protected.
Several courts have defended challenges to quasi-judicial immunity
arguing that there are built-in procedural safeguards to prevent abuses of
discretion and ensure the integrity of the decision-making process. 89 In
particular, (1) the voluntary use of arbitration,19 ° (2) the adversarial nature of
the process,' and (3) the right ofjudicial review compel the conclusion that
"the risk of a wrongful act by the arbitrators is outweighed by the need for
preserving the independence of their decision-making."' 92 Other safeguards
also include the potential liability of an arbitrator and the procedures for an
arbitrator's removal. 193 Moreover, because arbitrators are chosen by private
parties and are not subject to the political process,1 94 they are more insulated
from political pressures and are more likely to make reasoned decisions.'95
In contrast there are significant policy arguments against immunity.
First, immunity encourages carelessness by removing any incentives to be
cautious. Second, the system places finality of the decision above individual
justice. Third, disciplinary remedies are generally unavailable against
arbitrators.96 Fourth, although parties have consented to arbitration, they
have not consented to be abused and there is an implied duty of good faith
188. Pickens v. Templeton, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 718, 725.
189. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 508-11 and Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 27.
190. As Professor Park aptly put it, by agreeing to arbitration "the parties have assumed
the risk that the arbitrator may get it wrong on the merits of the dispute." Park, supra note
2, at 200.
191. See Mettler, supra note 101, at 26 (arguing that the adversarial nature of the process,
the right to an attorney, to discovery, and presentation of witnesses and evidence provides
sufficient procedural safeguards).
192. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1210 (6' Cir. 1982). Professor
Nolan also argues that by voluntarily submitting the dispute to arbitration the parties assume
the risk of a breakdown in the process and accept the lack of a remedy for the resulting harm.
See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 83, at 234.
193. See Mettler, supra note 101, 26-27.
194. In some jurisdictions within the United States, judges are elected through the normal
political process.
195. See Mattera, supra note 88, at 785; cf Sponseller, supra note 4 (arguing that
arbitrators are not politically insular because they often participate in the same industry in
which they arbitrate disputes). There is also a sense that an arbitrator's concern about his
professional reputation and getting "repeat business" is a sufficient basis for acting in a
highly professional basis. See BUTLER, supra note 11, at 108.
196. See Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 56. But see infra notes 343-44, 252-55, and supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
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that courts should recognize. Finally, the alternative remedies are inadequate
because parties cannot be made whole and the arbitrator's behavior cannot
be punished merely through vacatur and the withholding of fees.197
Moreover, courts should be wary of completely abdicating their judicial
responsibility merely because they wish to clear over-crowded court dockets.
Ultimately, however, the acceptance of these various policy arguments
depends upon the law of the relevant jurisdiction.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
There is a broad spectrum of arbitral immunity with one end providing
absolute immunity and the other absolute liability. In between, there are
types of qualified immunity where arbitrators are immune with respect to
some acts performed in the exercise of their functions and not others. 198 Part
III examines variations in the existence and scope of arbitral immunity in
national laws and institutional rules.
A. National Laws
Most countries accept the proposition that, like judges, arbitrators can
be criminally liable for their actions. Some countries accept that arbitrators
should be liable for actions taken in a personal or executive capacity.
Beyond this, the scope of liability varies significantly. To complicate
matters, most countries do not have express statutes clearly delineating the
scope of arbitrator liability and few courts have addressed this issue.
1. The Extreme: Absolute Immunity
In the United States, an arbitrator is absolutely immune from civil
liability for all acts related to his decision-making functions.1 99 The scope of
immunity even extends to situations where the arbitrator was careless,
197. See Okekeifere, supra note 184, at 136-38.
198. See LEW, supra note 5, at 4.
199. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on the United States, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 18 (1998). However, American arbitrators will
not be immune if: (1) the arbitrator does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter,
and (2) the conduct does not constitute an "arbitral acts" performed by the arbitrator. See
Sponseller, supra note 4, at 427. But broad immunity does not shield arbitrators from
criminal liability for fraud or corruption. See Earle v. Johnson, 84 N.W. 332, 333 (Minn.
1900).
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20grossly negligent, or intentionally acted in a fraudulent manner. ° Instead of
imposing liability for bad-faith behavior such as fraud and conspiracy, the
American cases hold that the arbitrator's inappropriate behavior merely
prevented them from collecting their arbitral fees.
20 1
Courts have extended absolute immunity to arbitrators on the ground
that federal policy encourages arbitration and "arbitrators are indispensable
actors in furtherance of that policy. '20 2 They have even gone so far as to
expand the umbrella of quasi-judicial actions to include conduct that seems
largely administrative in nature.203 While some assert that when an arbitrator
fails to act he is not "functionally comparable" to a judge and loses
immunity, most have been willing to find arbitrators immune for delay or
failure to render an award.0 4 Most recently, there is a profound
unwillingness to allow arbitrators to be liable for any behavior, let alone
complete abandonment oftheir quasi-judicial mandate. Following this trend,
California and Florida have statutes providing arbitrators with absolute civil
immunity for their actions or inaction.20 5
Similarly, before the Arbitration Act of 1996 clarified the position of
English law, English case law provided nearly unlimited immunity for
arbitrators. Despite the confusion created by Sutcliffe v. Thackrah20 6 and
Arenson v. Arenson,0 7 all arbitrators were entitled to immunity when
performing a judicial function.2 °5 In contrast to the American position on
200. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. cases where
arbitrators have been held immune despite their intentional, reprehensible conduct).
201. See Beaver v. Brown, 9 N.W. 911 (Iowa 1881) and Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 140
(Iowa 1880)
202. Mattera, supra note 88, at 787.
203. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text. Immunity can attach to arbitral acts
and all "indispensable proceedings" related to the arbitration process. See Mattera, supra
note 88, at 787; see also Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393,
398 (S.C. 1968) (holding that absolute immunity attaches to all "indispensable proceedings").
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1297.119 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 684.35 (1998) (providing
immunity for arbitrations against actions arising from their performance of the arbitrators'
duties).
206. [1974] App. Cas. 727.
207. [1977] App. Cas. 405.
208. Mustill and Boyd suggest that the primary characteristic of such a function is that
"the person who performs it is required to adjudicate upon an existing formulated dispute.
But there are other matters which help to show whether or not the person in question is acting
judicially; in particular, whether he receives evidence and arguments from the parties."
MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 11, at 226.
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liability, however, England considered the terms of the arbitrator's
appointment20 9 and left open the possibility for liability for fraud.210
Interestingly, in one civil law based country, absolute immunity may be
possible. In Brazil, Article 17 of the new arbitration act declares that
arbitrators are "subject to the effects of criminal legislation as are civil
servants."21' Because former provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
establishing arbitrator liability have been repealed, it is likely that the
exclusive focus on criminal liability for inappropriate acts may create a basis
for completely immunizing arbitrators from civil liability.
212
2. The Middle Position: Qualified Immunity
a. Express Immunity
When originally proposed, the UNCITRAL Model Law did not contain
an express provision making arbitrators liable or immune from their acts or
omissions. In fact, the Model Law's legislative history indicates that the
issue of arbitrator liability was specifically ignored because "the liability
problem is not widely regulated and remains highly controversial."213
However, some countries addressed this issue when adopting the Model Law.
Several countries allow extensive arbitrator immunity, but limit it where
the arbitrator has acted in bad faith. For example, unlike countries such as
Canada,214 when Bermuda adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1993 it
209. See id.
210. See LEW, supra note 5, at 27; see also Arenson, [1974] App. Cas. at 432-33 (stating
that "it is conceded that an arbitrator is immune from suit, aside from fraud") and MUSTILL
& BOYD, supra note 11, at 232 (noting that in English courts an arbitrator is not liable if the
"honest" acts, "not in bad faith" or "without fraud," and that "arbitrators can be held liable
in damages, in the event of serious want of impartiality, but give no guidance as to how far
this liability extends").
211. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11 (1998).
212. Under the old Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 1082 and 1083 created a basis for
extending liability to arbitrators. In particular, under Article 1082, "[t]he arbitrator is liable
for loss and damages if: (I) he does not make the award, so causing the expiration of the
submission; (II) he withdraws without justifiable cause after the acceptance of his
appointment." Id. at 11 n.3.
213. HOWARD M. HOLTZMAN & JOSEPHE.NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
COMMENTARY 1119 (1989) citing First Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/207, para. 70. See also id.
at 1443, 1148-50 (providing the legislative history of the rejected provision regarding
arbitrator liability).
214. Canada essentially adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in total and, federally, has
2000]
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expressly provided that, "an arbitrator is not liable for any act or omission in
the capacity of arbitration in connection with any arbitration." '215 The Act
includes the proviso that arbitrators may be liable for the consequences of
conscious and deliberate wrongdoing.216
Similarly, section 28 of the Australia International Arbitration Act of
1984 provides that an arbitrator "is not liable for negligence in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done in the capacity of arbitrator, but is liable
for fraud in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in that
capacity. ,21  The Province of Victoria has a similar provision that gives• 218
arbitrators immunity for most actions, but not fraud. Unfortunately, neither
statute indicates whether an arbitrator would be liable for grossly negligent
acts such as failure to render an award or completely abandoning the arbitral
mandate. However, pre-existing case law may still be applicable.2 9
England's new 1996 Arbitration Act provides arbitrators with a statutory
basis for immunity in tort, contract, or otherwise.2 Section 29 provides an
never addressed the civil liability of arbitrators in international arbitration. See PETER
SANDERS, National Report on Canada, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 19 (1998) (noting that Canada only changed one word when it adopted the
Model Law and omitted the word "international" from the definition of commercial
arbitration). The irony is that during the drafting of the Model Law, the Canadian delegation
was the only one to suggest that arbitrators be given immunity for "good-faith" actions. See
HOLTZMAN & NEUHAUS, supra note 213, at 1149-50.
215. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Bermuda, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998)
216. See id. (citing International Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1993, § 34).
217. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Australia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Australia International Arbitration Act of 1984,
§ 28).
218. See id. (citing Victoria Commercial Arbitration Act of 1984 § 52 (stating that an
arbitrator "is not liable for negligence in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by
the arbitration ... in the capacity of arbitration ... but is liable for fraud in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done in that capacity")).
219. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
220. See PETER SANDERS, NationalReport on England, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 30 (1998). This broad statutory immunity, however, does not
protect an arbitrator from liability incurred by reason of resigning. Sections 29(3) and 25 do
provide for the potential liability of an arbitrator for his withdrawal from the arbitration. The
parties are free to agree with an arbitrator of the consequences of resignation regarding
entitlement to fees or expenses and any liability. See Arbitration Act § 25(1). Otherwise,
a resigning arbitrator must apply to a court for: (1) relief from liability or (2) an order
regarding fees and expenses. See Arbitration Act § 25(3). In making the determination
about liability, the court will consider whether the resignation was reasonable. See
Arbitration Act § 25(4). This provision is unique because it allows an arbitrator to go to
court prospectively to obtain a "grant [of] relief from liability" incurred by reason of
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arbitrator with general immunity for anything done or omitted in the
discharge or purported discharge of his functions as arbitrator. There are
only two specific situations justifying liability: (1) if an arbitral act or
omission is done "in bad faith, '221 and (2) if a court determines withdrawal
is unreasonable.2 2 Although immunity under the Arbitration Act is fairly
broad, unlike the U.S. approach, it is qualified to give parties a remedy for
an arbitrator's intentional misconduct.
Other countries, like New Zealand and Singapore, address whether
arbitrators are liable for their negligent acts. Although it did not adopt the
Model Law, under section 13 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996,
an arbitrator is "not liable for negligence in respect of anything done or
omitted to be done in the capacity of the arbitrator., 223 Because the only
specific exclusion involves negligence, an arbitrator could still be liable for
grossly negligent or intentional acts. Moreover, pre-existing case law may
still apply, and Pickens did not overrule the possibility that bad faith and
fraud could make an arbitrator liable.224
Similarly, when Singapore adopted the Model Law in the International
Arbitration Act of 1994, it provided that an arbitrator shall not be liable in
two situations. In particular, an arbitrator is immune for: (1) negligent acts
"done or omitted to be done in the capacity of [an] arbitrator" and (2) "any
mistake in law, fact or procedure made in the course of arbitral proceedings
or in the making of an arbitral award. '225 Despite Singapore's significant
resignation. See Arbitration Act § 25(3)(a).
Under § 74, the Act also expressly provides immunity to arbitral institutions and
their employees in the discharge or purported discharge of its duties unless the act or
omission is done in bad faith. See Arbitration Act § 74(1). Similarly, the Act expressly
immunizes institutions from vicarious liability for the conduct of an arbitrator in the
discharge of his functions. See Arbitration Act § 74(2).
221. One important critique of the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act act is that it does
not expressly define "bad faith," but rather leaves the judiciary to interpret this term.
Thomas Carbonneau, A Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 22 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 131, 142 (1997). Currently, under English law, "bad faith" means actual malice
or actual knowledge of the absence of any power to discharge the function at issue. See
SANDERS, National Report on England, supra note 220, at 31-32; see also Melton Medes v.
Securities and Inv. Bd., [1995] 3 All. E.R. 880, 890 (defining "bad faith" in a narrow sense
that "a moral element is an essential ingredient. Lack of good faith connotes either (a)
malice in the sense of personal spite or desire to injure for improper reasons, or (b)
knowledge of absence of power to make the decision in question."
222. See English Arbitration Act of 1996, § 25.
223. PETER SANDERS, National Report on New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing New Zealand Arbitration Act of 1996, § 13).
224. See Pickens v. Templeton, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 718, 727.
225. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Singapore, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
limitation of liability, because negligent acts and mistakes are the only acts
expressly granted immunity, it is quite likely that arbitrators would still be
liable for acts of gross negligence or intentional misconduct.
b. Implied Immunity
Although it is not enumerated by statute, many other countries provide
for immunity except for situations of intentional misconduct. Belgium, for
example, does not have an express provision of its arbitration law providing
for the immunity or liability of arbitrators. 226 However, two unreported cases
have addressed the issue. In the first case, the Civil Court of Brussels
determined that arbitrators are not protected by judicial immunity and could
be liable for damages resulting from a "serious mistake. 227 Although one
commentator suggested these "mistakes" might include withdrawal without
a valid reason or failure to render a decision within the time limit, a 1992
decision by the Antwerp Court of Appeal explained that an arbitrator is only
liable for serious offences equivalent to a false representation or fraud.228
This seems to establish immunity for cases that do not involve bad faith or
intentional misconduct, a position similar to that of England and other
countries.
Canada is another country that might provide an implied basis for
extending arbitral immunity. Although there is no statute on point, under
Sport Maska, arbitrators may be immune as the functional equivalent of
judges. 29 As a former commonwealth country, Canada may also holds
arbitrators liable for fraud.230  Although usually applied in domestic
arbitrations,231 British Columbia and Alberta do expressly provide for
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing International Arbitration Act of 1994, § 25).
226. Under the 1985 arbitration law, arbitrators are removable on the same grounds as
judges. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing art. 1690, Sixth Part, Judicial Code).
227. Id. at 15 (citing decision of the Civil Court of Brussels, June 6, 1980, cited in Huys
& Keutgen, L 'Arbitrage, Cronique deJurisprudence, 1975-1982, JOURNALDES TRIBUNAUX
54 no. 28 (1984)).
228. Id. at 15 (citing decision of the Antwerp Court of Appeal, Jan. 21, 1992, cited in
Huys & Keutgen, L'Arbitrage, Cronique de Jurisprudence, 1975-1982, JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX (1987 to 1992) no. 30.)
229. See generally Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer [1988] 1 S.C.R. 564, 38 Bus. L. REP. 221
(1988).
230. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
231. Although there is a sense that these statutes only apply to domestic arbitration
because of the separate statutes for international arbitration, there is no provision excluding
their application to international arbitrations.
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arbitrator liability, but only when a court first orders removal. In British
Columbia, if the court removes an arbitrator for: "(a) corrupt or fraudulent
conduct, or (b) undue delay in proceeding with the arbitration or in the
making of the award," the arbitrator will receive no remuneration for his
services. The arbitrator will also be required to pay all or part of the costs
that the parties have incurred up to the date of his removal.232 Similarly in
Alberta, if a court removes an arbitrator for "a corrupt or fraudulent act or for
-undue delay," it can order that the arbitrator receive no payment as well as
compensate the parties for their costs. 233 Ultimately, these provinces expand
liability not just to bad-faith conduct but also to significant nonfeasance.
Other civil and Islamic law countries have greater liability because of
their focus on contractual duties but still provide for immunity in the making
of awards and the conduct of proceedings. Like most civil law countries,
Austria predicates the liabilities and duties of the arbitrator upon the contract
subject to the general civil law. 234 These obligations might include the duty
to conduct the proceedings appropriately, render an award, and be
objective.235 In older cases, arbitrators have been liable for ungrounded
resignation and conducting themselves in a way that has lead to an invalidity
of the awards. 36 In addition, under Article 584 of the Austrian Code of Civil
Procedure, an arbitrator who "does not fulfil in time or at all" his obligations
is "liable to the parties for all the loss caused by his wrongful refusal or
delay." '237 Despite this, under Austrian legal doctrine, arbitrators should
enjoy the same status as judges and be immune for acts during the conduct
of the proceedings and the making of awards.238 Ultimately, an arbitrator's
"liability for procedural mistakes or defective awards {is] limited to damage
caused by intent or gross negligence. 239
232. See 1986 British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act, § 18(2). The 1986 British
Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act is a blanket adoption of the UNCITRAL
Model Law.
233. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Canada, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing 1991 Alberta Arbitration Act, § 15(4)).
234. See Christian Hausmaninger, Immunity of Arbitrators Book Review, 6 FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 601, 602 (1991) [hereinafter "Hausmaninger II"].
235. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Austria, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8 (1998).
236. See LEW, supra note 5, at 17.
237. See SANDERS, supra note 235 (citing Austrian Code of Civil Procedure of 1983, art.
584).
238. See LEW, supra note 5, at 18.
239. Id. at 18-19.
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The Netherlands is similar to most civil law countries in that the
arbitrator's acceptance of appointment creates a mandate to render certain
services and failure to abide by the receptum arbitri can generate liability in
special circumstances. 240 Uniquely, arbitrators are given treatment that is
similar to judges and when making a decision "an error in law or fact will
never lead to liability. '24' This creates a small basis for qualified immunity.
Italy and South Africa, however, are in a slightly unique position since
they have an express basis for liability and implied basis for immunity.
South African case law provides that when an arbitrator performs functions
that are analogous to a judge, he is immune from liability provided that he
acts in good faith and in the honest discharge of his duties.242 Implicitly,
liability would be possible if an arbitrator acted in bad faith, but this will
probably involve an analysis of public policy.243 At the same time, section
13 of the 1965 Arbitration Act provides that if an arbitrator is removed from
office he shall not be entitled to any remuneration for his services. More
importantly, the statute indicates that apart from this, the court may order
costs against the arbitrator personally.2" It is this provision which expressly
opens the door to arbitrator liability.
Similarly, Italian arbitration law provides one express basis for liability.
When arbitrators have failed to render an award within the proper time limit
and the award is set aside on this ground.245 In addition, the arbitrator can
also be responsible for fraud.246 At the same time, however, at least one court
has held that an arbitrator's liability is limited to a loss of fees. 247 As a result
of the combination of these express and implied provisions, Italy appears to
have a limited basis for extending qualified immunity to arbitrators.
240. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on the Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14-15 (1998).
241. Id. at 15.
242. See PETER SANDERS, NationalReport on South Africa, in INTERNATIONALHANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 30 (1998) (citing Matthews v. Young, 1922 A.D. 492, 508-9
and Hoffman v. Meyer, 1952 (2) SA 752(C) at 756 (a-e)). Some authors suggest that this
immunity is limited to only negligent activities of an arbitrator, but this is still an unsettled
issue within South African law. See BUTLER & FINSEN, supra note 11, at 101-3.
243. See BUTLER & FINSEN, supra note 11, at 102-3.
244. See South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, § 13(3), in BUTLER & FINSEN, supra
note 11, at 319, 325.
245. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Italy, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24 (1998) (citing Italian Code of Civil Procedure, amended by
law No. 25 of 5 Jan. 1994, art. 813).
246. See id. at 25.
247. See id. (citing Court of Appeal of Palermo, 5 February 1952 in FOROITALIANO 1952,
I, p. 1017).
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Although Germany does not have an express provision regarding the
liability of arbitrators, most commentators assume that the arbitrators can be
liable on a contractual basis.248 Consequently, arbitrators can be liable for
failure to perform promised services 249 and, unless otherwise provided,
intentional and negligent acts. 250 This means that arbitrators are potentially
liable for such acts as delay in the arbitration proceedings, withdrawal
without serious cause, or failure to comply with procedural formalities.
251
". What makes Germany distinct is that an arbitrator is considered to enjoy
the same immunity granted to judges in state courts. 52  Although an
arbitrator does not receive immunity under German law because he is not a
253judge, courts imply a contractual immunity that the arbitrator shall not
receive less immunity than ajudge.2 54 Ultimately, this means that arbitrators
are immune from errors in the making of the award. However, similar to
German judges, they will probably still be liable for breaches of other duties
such as delay.
Unlike most Islamic law countries, Turkey takes a qualified approach to
arbitrator immunity that is similar to Germany.5 ' Although never addressed
by Turkish courts, academic literature consistently asserts that a limitation
of liability is likely.256 Although an arbitrator could be liable for negligence
under the contract theory, scholars argue that arbitrators should be liable on
248. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Germany, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (1998) and LEW, supra note 5, at 42-43.
249. See BGB §§ 611,675 in GOREN, supra note 39.
250. See id. § 276(1).
251. See LEW, supra note 5, at 42-43 and Hausmaninger II, supra note 234, at 603.
252. See SANDERS, supra note 248, at 14 and LEW, supra note 5, at 44-47.
253. Under German law, if a public official "wilfully or negligently commits a breach of
official duty.., he shall compensate the third party for any damage arising therefrom."
BGB § 839(1) in GOREN, supra note 39, at 155. But, judges are immune from liability when
act "in giving judgment." See id. at § 839(2) (stating that if an official "commits a breach
of his official duty in giving judgment in an action, he is not responsible for any damage
arising therefrom, unless the breach of duty is punished with a public penalty to been forced
by criminal proceedings"). This immunity does not apply, however, if the breach of duty
consists of "refusal or delay in the exercise of the office." Id.
254. See LEW, supra note 5, at 45-46, citing 65 RGZ 175 (1907) (explaining that although
arbitrators are not state officials when the parties appoint an arbitrator they implicitly agree
to hold him liable only to the standard in § 839) and Haftung des Shiedsrichters, 15 BGHZ
12 (implicitly agreeing that the position of the arbitrator is similar to that of a judge and
making an arbitrator liable for unjustifiably refusing to sign the arbitral award).
255. This is not necessary surprising given the strong civil law influence on Turkish law.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
256. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Turkey, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15-16 (1998).
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the same basis as judges since arbitration functions are similar to those of
judges. 7 If Turkish courts accept this theory, then an arbitrator would only
be liable for "serious offences like fraud, but not for errors made in good
faith or mistakes in fact or law. 258
China has an express provision for liability for certain bad-faith actions,
but there may be an implied basis for extending immunity for other acts.
Specifically, in its 1995 Arbitration Law, China created sanctions for two
types of inappropriate arbitrator activities. First, an arbitrator can be held".
liable if the arbitrator has "privately met with a party or agent, or accepted
an invitation to entertainment or a gift 259 and the "circumstance is
,,211serious. Presumably, a sufficiently serious circumstance would involve
a case where the actions give rise to a justifiable doubt regarding the integrity
of the award and the decision-making process. Second, an arbitrator can be
liable if he "committed embezzlement, accepted bribes, practiced graft, or
made an award that perverted the law.""26 Given the serious nature of these
inappropriate arbitrator actions, it is unclear whether less offensive conduct
such as negligence would create liability; but because the People's Congress
had the opportunity to create additional liability and it failed to do so, this
may be the extent of an arbitrator's liability in China. Interestingly, when an
arbitrator is liable there are two important ramifications. First, the arbitrator
assumes full legal responsibility. Second, the arbitrator's name will be
removed from the list of potential arbitrators.262
3. The Extreme: Unlimited Liability
a. Express Liability
In those with an express basis for finding liability, countries tend to base
liability on faults such as inappropriate withdrawal, failure to render an
award, and general failure to abide by the term of their appointment. As
257. This theory might be supported by the fact that the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the "grounds for challenge of arbitrators are the same as for judges." Id.
258. Id. at 15.
259. PETER SANDERS, National Report on China, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of
China, arts. 38 & 34(4)).
260. Id. at art. 38.
261. Id. at arts. 38 & 58(6).
262. See id. at art. 38. At least one commentator has suggested full "legal responsibility"
subjects arbitrators to the full range of civil and criminal liability.
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there is no indication in these countries of immunity, however, liability
probably extends to all negligent acts and breaches of duty.
Although there may be additional implied grounds of liability, many
Arab countries create express liability for improper resignation. In Qatar, an
arbitrator is liable to the parties if he withdraws without serious grounds.263
Similarly, in Tunisia, the 1993 Arbitration Code does not provide any
immunity for arbitrators and, instead, expressly subjects an arbitrator to
damages if he "withdraw[s] without good reason. 2 64 Libya also has a law
that does not create immunity but instead provides for an arbitrator's liability
for withdrawal without good reason.2 65  Under the New Code of Civil
Procedure, Lebanese law expressly provides that an arbitrator "will become
liable" if he withdraws without sufficient reason.266  However, in
international arbitration, parties may opt out of this provision through
agreement.267
Other Muslim countries create liability for resignation but add additional
bases of liability. In Syria, if arbitrators resign except for a serious reason
they may be required to compensate the parties.268 Moreover, since
arbitrators are not subject to the same procedures for judicial liability,
arbitrators are liable for any negligence or fault committed during the
arbitration.269
Indonesia creates arbitral liability for improper withdrawal from the
270arbitration. In addition, unless they give a "justifiable reason," arbitrators
263. See Qatari Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art. 194, in EL-AHDAB, supra
note 13, at 904.
264. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Tunisia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing 1993 Tunisia Arbitration Code, art. 11). In
Bahrain, under domestic arbitration law, if an arbitrator withdraws without good cause, he
may be liable in damages. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 108 (citing Bahrain Code of
Procedure, art. 234. Although there is a Bahraini International Arbitration Act, no provision
within this statute expressly addresses the issue of arbitrator liability).
265. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Libya, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (1998) (citing Libyan Code of Civil and Commercial
Procedure of 1953, art. 748).
266. See Lebanon New Code of Civil Procedure, art. 769 in EL-AHDAB, supra note 13,
at 864.
267. See id. at 871, art. 812
268. See Syrian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 514 in EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 928 and
SALEH, supra note 22, at 100.
269. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 658-59.
270. Under Indonesian law, the only appropriate withdrawal is that "approved by the
Court." See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Code of Civil Procedure, Third Book, Title 1,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
are liable for damages if they fail to "make their award within the period of
time fixed for it. '271' The default time period established for making an award
is six months from the day an arbitrator accepts the appointment.272 Because
arbitrators usually accept their appointments on different days, this has
particularly interesting ramifications in the case of multiple-member
tribunals. In essence, even if the same national law would apply, different
arbitrators could have different times establishing their liability.
Other countries create express liability for arbitrators who fail to fulfill
their contractual duties. Spain has interesting provisions regarding the
liability of arbitrators; and it addresses the liability of the arbitral institution.
Specifically, once they accept their mandate, arbitrators must "faithfully
fulfill their duties. ' 273 If they fail to do so, they "shall be responsible for the
damages caused by their fraud or fault., 274 Similarly, the statute empowers
injured parties to bring an independent claim against the arbitral
institution.275 Moreover, under Article 14, arbitrators who have "previously
failed to fulfill their functions within the established period, or who have
been held liable by a judgment for their unsatisfactory performance" are
prohibited from being arbitrators in future disputes.276
Under the Kuwait Arbitration Law of 1980, there is only one stated
ground for an arbitrator's liability. Specifically, "if the arbitrator, without
serious grounds, refrains from acting after having accepted his mission, he
may be liable in damages to the parties. 2 7 But, because arbitrators are also
required to accept their appointment in writing, failure to abide by duties
enumerated in the arbitration law is likely to lead to liability.278 Morocco has
a similar scope of arbitrator liability. Under the arbitration act of 1974,
art. 623).
271. Id. at art. 623.
272. See id. at art. 620.
273. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Spain, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON




276. Id. at art. 14. One commentator does note, however, that this raises an interesting
constitutional issue since this is a limitation upon an arbitrator's civil rights. See PETER
SANDERS, National Report on SaudiArabia, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOKON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 10 (1998).
277. Kuwait Law No. 38, art. 178 in EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 885.
278. See id. at 300.
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"arbitrators cannot refuse to act once they have started, else they shall have
to pay compensation to the parties for the damage thus caused.
2 179
The Argentine National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure
provides for liability in two circumstances. 28° First, once they have accepted
their appointment, arbitrators can be held liable for costs and damages for
failure to perform "arbitral functions. 281 Second, similar to the U.S. case of
Baar v. Tigerman,282 arbitrators are liable if they"without justification do not
render their award within the stated term. 283 Under this second provision,
arbitrators are liable for costs and damages, but they also "lose all right to
their fees.
284
Like Argentina, in the Peruvian 1996 General Arbitration Law an
arbitrator's acceptance of the appointment "entitles the parties to compel
them to discharge their responsibilities within the fixed period of time, under
penalty of being liable for the damages caused by delay or failure to comply
with their obligations., 285 Although this Act may not necessarily apply to
international arbitrators, arbitrators might still be liable for "inexcusable
malice, negligence, or ignorance. 286
Romania has one of the most developed provisions for liability. There
are four specific situations where arbitrators will be liable for damages: (1)
unjustified withdrawal, (2) failure without justification to take part in the
decision or make the award within the required time period, (3) publication
or disclosure of information without the parties' consent, and (4) flagrant
neglect of their duties.287 This last provision is quite large and probably
encompasses both contractual, statutory, and implied duties such as good
279. Act of 28 September 1974, art. 313. Id. at 885.
280. Argentine law also expressly provides for penal liability for arbitrators and judges.
See Hausmaninger II, supra note 234, at 602.
281. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIALARBrrRATION (1998) (citing National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure
of 1981, art. 745).
282. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
283. See SANDERS, supra note 281 (citing National Code of Civil and Commercial
Procedure of 1981, art. 756).
284. Id.
285. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Peru, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 11(1998) (citing General Arbitration Law, Law No. 26572, art.
18). Arbitrators can also be criminally liable under the Penal Code. Id.
286. Id. at 11.
287. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Romania, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1993,
art. 353).
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faith. Although there is no case law testing these standards, Romania is
unique in its extensive, express guidelines for arbitrator behavior.
Saudi Arabia applies traditional Islamic law principals to the issue of
arbitrator immunity. Although there is one primary basis for liability, its
potential is quite broad. The Qur'an contains the basic principle and states,
"[h]e that mediates in a good cause shall gain by his mediation; but he that
mediates in a bad cause shall be held accountable for its evil. 288 Under this
general principle, an arbitrator could be liable for negligence in "failing to
take note of important documents, in losing or damaging important
documents, or in failing to take note of a vital statement made by one of the
[parties]. 289 Essentially, an arbitrator is liable for nearly any fault he
commits which results in damage to any party.29° Although there was a
regulation proposed in 1979 to hold arbitrators liable for inappropriate
withdrawal, this was never enacted.29' Instead, Article 11 of the 1983
Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia provides that if the parties remove an
arbitrator who was "not the cause of such removal," the arbitrator may
"claim compensation" against the parties. 292 It is not clear, however, that the
failure to enact a legislative provision will immunize the otherwise broad
potential for arbitrator liability in Saudi Arabia.
b. Implied Liability
In most countries with implied liability, there is a focus on the
contractual nature of the relationship and the arbitrator's duty to perform
according to the receptum arbitri. Ultimately, however, these countries
include no basis for immunity and probably create liability for any
intentional, grossly negligent, or negligent behavior.
In France, there is no statute expressly providing for the liability or
immunity of arbitrators. However, parties can sue arbitrators for breach of
their arbitration contract for failure to perform according to the terms of
reference or negligence; 293 but liability can only arise from acts or omissions
falling within the exercise of their mission.2 94 Similarly, if an arbitrator
288. SANDERS, supra note 276, at 17 (citing KORAN, Al-Nisa (Women) 4:85).
289. SALAHHEJAILAN, National Report on Saudi Arabia, in 4 YEARBOOKOFCOMMERICAL
ARBITRATION 162, 167 (1979).
290. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 585.
291. See SANDERS, supra note 276, at 17.
292. See id. at 27-28 (citing Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia, art. 11).
293. See LEW, supra note 5, at 34.
294. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on France, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
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breaches the confidence of parties, they might either be subject to criminal
penalties or suits of damages.295 Comparable to the liability existing for
judges under Article 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arbitrators may be
liable for denials ofjustice including: (1) withdrawal without a valid reason,
(2) failure to render an award within the applicable time limit, and (3) failing
to perform arbitral duties.296 Although it has been suggested that an arbitrator
should be entitled to immunity because of his "jurisdictional function" in
rendering a "final and binding decision," French law appears to afford
arbitrators no immunity.297 Ultimately, the private contractual nature of his
appointment makes him fully liable for his wrongful acts.298 In a recent case
with unique application, a French court addressed the immunity of an
institution. Although the court found a contract between the parties and the
arbitration institute and noted the failure to properly execute its obligations,
in Socit Cubic Defense System v. Chambre de Commerce Internationale,
the court rejected liability on the part of the ICC.
29 9
Swedish law also does not have a statute expressly providing for liability
for arbitrators, and, at the same time, there does not appear to be any basis for
extending arbitral immunity.00 In general, however, grounds for liability
include the obstruction of proceedings, failure to observe applicable rules of
procedure, or conviction of a crime committed in connection with
consideration of the matter in dispute. Interestingly, in unique contrast to
Baar, the failure to render a timely award does not entail the arbitrator's
liability if a foreign party is involved as the arbitration law does not have a
statute to address this issue.30 1
Under Polish law, there is no express provision for immunity, but there
is an implied provision regarding liability. Specifically, because the
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Jean-Baptiste Gouault v. Jacques Gouault, REv.
ARB. 39 (1978)).
295. See Penal Code art. 378. This provision, however, seems more appropriate in
domestic arbitrations. See SANDERS, supra note 294, at 27-28.
296. See SANDERS, supra note 294, at 27-28; see also 1981 Code of Civil Procedure, art.
1462 (requiring arbitrators to "proceed with their mission until it is completed").
297. See LEW, supra note5, at 35-36.
298. See Hausmaninger II, supra note 234, at 603. Grounds for arbitral liability include:
unjustified resignation, procrastination of proceedings, loss of evidence, breach of
confidentiality of the deliberations. A party must demonstrate a minimum of gross
negligence to challenge any error in the making of an award. Id.
299. See SANDERS, supra note 294, at 27-28 n.81(citing Soci&6 Cubic Defense Sys. v.
Chamber de Commerce Internationale, [1997] REv. AB. 417).
300. See LEW, supra note 5, at 81-84.
301. See Hausmaninger II, supra note 234, at 605.
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relationship between the arbitrators and the parties is deemed to be a contract
for services, 3 °2 liability is possible. Therefore a party who sustains damage
because of an arbitrator's "wrongful act or omission, including an award, and
who proves that this arbitrator acted negligently or wilfully," would probably
be entitled to damages. Unfortunately, there are no cases addressing this
issue.
3 03
Swiss law is similar to Polish law in that its 1987 International
Arbitration Act does not contains any rules for civil liability or immunity.
Instead, the receptum arbitri is considered to be a mandate or quasi-mandate,
and the arbitrator is therefore liable for negligence or any other inappropriate
conduct or omission. There is a sense, however, that strict criteria will be
applied before an arbitrator can be found negligent.3 4
For a majority of Islamic countries, the potential liability of an arbitrator
is quite broad. In Iraq, after accepting appointment, "an arbitrator may not
decline to act without a just cause."30 5 Although this does not expressly
create liability, at least one commentator asserts that this becomes a part of
the receptum arbitri and is an implied basis of liability.36 The potential
scope of immunity, however, is never discussed. Although the Egyptian
Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of 1968 did provide for arbitrator
liability for resignation "without serious reason, 307 under the new 1994 Law
Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopting the
UNCITRAL Model Law, there is no express provision for arbitrator liability
or immunity.3 8 Although one author asserts that the duties implied by the
1994 create the basis for liability, this is not necessarily certain.30 9
Jordan's 1952 Arbitration Act does not contain an express provision for
liability. But, under the current law an arbitrator is generally not liable if she
302. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
303. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Poland, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 13 (1998).
304. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (1998).
305. 1969 Iraq Code of Civil Procedure, art. 260, in EL-AHDAB supra note 13, at 837.
306. See EL-AHDAB, supra note 13, at 221.
307. PETER SANDERS, National Report on Egypt, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998) (citing Chapter III of Book No. III of the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure, art. 503(1)).
308. See EL-AHDAB. Law ConcerningArbitration in Civil and Commercial Matter, supra
note 13, at 821-35.
309. See id. at 175 (asserting that because the arbitrator accepts his mission in writing, he
has a contractual obligation to make an award within a specific time period and fully declare
his independence or impartiality-otherwise this creates a basis of extending liability).
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refuses to perform her mission; but if a party can prove a link between the
damages and the refusal of an arbitrator to act, the general rules of liability
apply.310 Yemen has a similar standard of liability. Although arbitrators are
not required to accept in writing, 31 the arbitrator is a party to the agreement
to arbitrate and is contractually bound to perform according to the agreement
and is potentially liable for any breaches.312 Overall, the potential for liability
in these countries is quite extreme in comparison to common law countries.
B. Institutional Rules
Many arbitration institutions do not have express rules elucidating the
existence or scope of arbitral immunity,31 3 but several frequently used
institutions do. The London Court of International Arbitration provides that
no arbitrator "shall be liable to any party howsoever for any act or omission
in connection with any arbitration conducted" under the auspices of the
LCIA.314 However, the LCIA does provide an exception where the arbitrator
can be liable for "conscious or deliberate wrongdoing. 3 5 Similarly, the
American Arbitration Association provides arbitrators will not be liable "to
any party for any act or omission" except that they can be held liable for "the
consequences of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing. 31 6  The World
Intellectual Property Organization also has a similar standard for immunity
where, "[e]xcept in respect of deliberate wrongdoing, the arbitrator or
arbitrators, WIPO and the Center shall not be liable to a party for any act or
omission in connection with the arbitration."3 7 In essence, these institutions
provide arbitrators with immunity, but draw the line at an arbitrator's
310. See id. at 249. There is, however, a new arbitration bill that is being considered in
Jordan. There are no express provisions for arbitrator liability, but instead, there are uniform
standards allowing for dismissal of an arbitrator and the setting aside of the award. See id.
at 273-74.
311. See Yemen Presidential Decree No. 22-1992 Issuing the Arbitration Act, art. 4, Id.
at 960.
312. See id. at 755.
313. For example, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and CIETAC do not have any rules
addressing arbitrator immunity.
314. The New London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 31.1 (effective Jan.
1, 1998).
315. Id.
316. American Arbitration Association, International Arbitration Rules, art. 35 (visited
May 12, 2000) <http://www.adr.org>.
317. World Intellectual Property Organization Rules on International Arbitration,
Arbitration Rules: Miscellaneous, art. 77 (visited May 12, 2000) <http://www.arbiter.
wipo.int/arbitration/arbitration-rules/miscellaneous.html>.
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intentional or bad-faith actions. Similarly, although they do not have the
force of law unless the parties incorporate them into their agreement, the
International Bar Association's Rules for Ethics for International Arbitrators
provide for immunity except in cases of "wilful or reckless disregard of their
legal obligations." '318
The International Chamber of Commerce, in contrast; provides that
arbitrators will not "be liable to any person for any act or omission in
connection with the arbitration."'319 The Netherlands Arbitration Institute
also provides broad immunity. "Neither the NAI, nor any member of its
governing Board, nor the Administrator, nor any arbitrator can be held liable
for any act or omission with regard to an arbitration governed by [the NAI]
Rules."32 Interestingly, the Bahrain International Commercial Arbitration
Center recently made an amendment providing for "judicial immunity for the
acts done by them to carry out their duties. 3 1 Ultimately, these institutions
do not necessarily provide an express exception for bad-faith actions, and
appear, on the surface, more similar to the absolute immunity of the United
States.
C. Contractual Immunity
An arbitrator can try to secure immunity as a term of appointment.322
There are, however, two potential problems. First, in some jurisdictions,
liability for gross negligence or intentional wrongs cannot be excluded in
advance by contract.323 Second, the fact that one party agrees to hold an
318. International Bar Association, Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators,
Introductory Note, 26 I.L.M. 583 (1987), 12 Y.B. CoMM. ARB. 199, 199 (1987).
319. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, art. 34 (effective Jan. 1,
1998). Although they were eliminated from later versions of the Rules, the ICC was one of
the first institutions to have a provision on the liability of arbitrators. In particular, in art. 18
of the 1922 Rules, the rule provided that "it was understood and agreed that any such
decision [regarding provisional measures] shall not carry with it any personal responsibility
on the part of such arbitrators." Eric A. Schwartz, The Practices and Experience of the ICC
Court, in ICC, CONSERVATORY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 45 (1993), ICC Pub. No. 519.
320. Netherlands Arbitration Institute Rules, art. 66 (effective Jan. 1, 1993).
321. Hassan Radhi et al., Law on International CommercialArbitration Center Amended,
10 MIDDLE E. EXECutrivE REP. 19 (1996).
322. Even in the United States, it may be possible for arbitrators to make an indemnity
agreement with the parties. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 20.
323. See id. at 20. For example, in Austria, according to the Austrian Civil Law Code, an
exclusion agreement concerning intent or gross negligence would be considered invalid. See
LEW, supra note 5, at 15 citing AUSTRIAN CIVIL LAW CODE Art. 879(1) and BGB § 276(2)
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arbitrator immune does not mean that both parties will hold the arbitrator
harmless for any wrongdoing. For example, in Fal Bunkering ofSharjah v.
Greacale Inc. of Panama, an English court determined that special
appointment terms requested by one arbitrator were not binding upon all of
the parties.324 Consequently, an arbitrator who accepts his appointment with
a contractual-immunity condition can probably only enforce it against the
appointing party.325
There are significant benefits for arbitrating under an institution with
rules for arbitral immunity. Specifically, once the parties and the arbitrators
have agreed that pre-existing arbitration rules of an arbitration association
govern the proceedings, these rules become an implied term of the
arbitrator's appointment326 and the parties consent to hold the arbitrator
harmless when incorporating the rules by reference.327 This solves the Fal
Bunkering problem and creates a term of immunity binding upon both
parties. Consequently, the arbitrators have created their own contractual
immunity and will be nearly impervious to suits from disgruntled parties.
IV. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE OF IMMUNITY
Because of the lack of uniformity among national laws and the extreme
variations in the potential scope of liability, the law applicable to the
immunity issue can have a profound impact upon the ultimate determination
of an arbitrator's susceptibility to suit. How then should courts determine
which law is applicable to an arbitrator's immunity?
Some merely assert that the law applicable to the immunity issue will
either be that of(1) an arbitrator's domicile, (2) the seat of the arbitration, (3)
the proper law of the arbitration agreement, or (3) the place where the injured
party is located.3 28 In contrast, others suggest a more reasoned analysis and
in GOREN, supra note 39 (preventing parties from contracting out of wilful misconduct); see
also BERGER, supra note 12, at 236 n.247 (noting that it follows from normal principles of
contract law that the waiver for gross negligence or intentional acts or omissions in the
decision making process is forbidden). Even under English law, an arbitrator's contractual
grant of immunity must be "reasonable" and not induced by fraud. See SANDERS, supra note
307.
324. See Fal Bunkering of Sharjah v. Grecale Inc. of Panama, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 369,372-73
(Eng. 1990).
325. See SMITH, supra note 29, at 25.
326. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 43.
327. See THOMAS OEHMKE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARBITRATION 282-83 (1990).
328. See BERGER, supra note 12, at 233 (asserting that an arbitrator's rights, duties, and
liabilities flow from the law of the seat of the arbitration); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
2000)
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an application of the appropriate choice of law rules. The latter approach is
preferable as it involves a reasoned analysis instead of a blanket
categorization.
3 29
The first issue is one of characterization and whether the breach of duty
is based upon contract or tort. If the action is based upon tort, the applicable
law will probably be that of the lex loci delict commissi-where the
defendant's wrongful action occurred. In the United States, a court usually
applies the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred.33° In Germany,
courts will probably also apply the lex loci deliciti commissi.331  For
arbitration, although it is subject to the particularities of the individual case,
the place of the arbitrator's misconduct will probably be the situs of the
arbitration. Therefore, the law of the situs may apply.
In contrast, a different result might occur if the action were based on
contract. The next issue is whether: (1) there is a distinct contract between
the parties, i.e. the receptum arbitri, that is subject to one law; or (2) the
arbitrators are merely third parties to the arbitration agreement which is
potentially subject to a different law. 32
8, at 266 (noting that the relevant system of law may confer immunity from liability and the
applicable law "is usually the law of the place of arbitration, but may be the proper law of
the arbitration agreement"); and Hoellering, supra note 129, at 106 (asserting, without any
supporting sources, that "the immunity accorded to an arbitrator will also depend on the
place of arbitration and country in which the complaint is lodged").
329. In a discussion regarding the liability and immunity of false testimony by a witness,
one commentator suggested the following approach towards determining the applicable law:
"First a court with the competence to hear the case must be found and jurisdiction
established. Next, one must consult the jurisdiction's choice of law rules which eventually
refer to the appropriate substantive law... A common basis ofjurisdiction, apart from the
defendant's habitual domicile or residence, is the place where the defendant committed the
tortious act or where the injured persons or property is located." Marianne Roth, False
Testimony in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative View, 7 N.Y. L. SCH.
J.INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 148-49 (1994).
330. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1934). Different states,
however, apply different choice of law procedures. The First Restatement focused on the
law of the place of the wrong. See id. However, if it is a malpractice action involving the
application of the standard of care, the standard will be taken from the place of the
arbitrator's conduct. See id.at § 380(2). This may also be the situs.
In the Second Restatement, in contrast, there is more of a focus on the "center of
gravity"-the place with the most significant relationship. For torts, courts will consider
factors such as the place where the injury occurred, the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred, the domicile and residence of the parties involved, and the place where the
relationship of the parties is centered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§
187, 188 (1971).
331. See LEW, supra note 5, at 47.
332. Currently, there is a great deal of confusion regarding which law governs the
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Initially, if a court characterizes the receptum arbitri as making the
arbitrator a third party to the arbitration agreement between the parties, the
law governing immunity will probably be the law applicable to the
arbitration agreement. Although there is significant variation and
opportunities for the parties to vary this by agreement, the law applicable to
the arbitration agreement is often the law applicable to the primary dispute.333
The court may, however, characterize it as a separate contract, and
therefore it is necessary to determine which law was applicable to the
receptum arbitri. German law, for example, distinguishes between the law
applicable to: (1) the main contract underlying the original dispute, (2) the
arbitration agreement, and (3) the arbitrator's contract to arbitrate.334
Similarly, common law countries recognize distinctions among the law
applicable to: (1) the main contract, (2) the arbitration agreement, and (3) the
curial law governing the procedure of the arbitration.335
Under German law, parties are entitled to choose the law applicable to
the contract and are allowed to choose a different law for the main contract
than one for the arbitration agreement.336 Similarly, under the common law,
the law governing the procedure of an arbitration is not necessarily the one
as the law governing the arbitration agreement and substantive contract.
337
Therefore, arbitrators are free to include a choice of law clause to clarify
which law governs their receptum arbitri. Unfortunately, this is rarely done
and courts must continue in their choice of law analysis.
Under German law, there are certain instances when there is an implied
choice of law for the receptum arbitri. Specifically: (1) when the law for the
arbitration procedure is expressly chosen, this is also the law applicable to
the arbitrator's contract; (2) if the arbitration agreement expressly chooses an
arbitration agreement. This will probably vary from case to case. See Adam Samuel, The
Effect of the Place ofArbitration on the Enforcement of the Agreement to Arbitrate, in THE
PLACE OF ARBITRATION 46-57 (Marcel Storme et al. eds., 1992).
333. The proper law of the arbitration agreement also might be the law of the place of
arbitration. Again, however, this is largely dependent upon the facts of the particular case
and the substance of the arbitration agreement. See generally Michael Pryles, Choice ofLaw
Issues in International Arbitration, 63 ARB. 200 (1997).
334. See LEW, supra note 5, at 47.
335. See PRYLES, supra note 333, at 201-8.
336. See LEW, supra note 5, at 47 citing 15 BGHZ 12 (1954).
337. See Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty Constr., [1993] App. Cas. 334,357 and
NavieraAmozonica Perunca v. Cia Int'l de Sesuros del Peru, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 116,
120. Section 1-105(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code allows parties to a commercial
transaction to choose a law that has a reasonable relationship to the forum; otherwise if the
parties do not make a choice of law, the law applied must have an appropriate relation to the
state. See U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
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arbitrator, the governing law is impliedly the law of the arbitrator's domicile;
and (3) where there is an express choice of forum, this is conclusive as to the
law to be applied to the proceedings.338 This German law will only govern
where: (1) German law governs the procedure, (2) German arbitrators have
been appointed, and (3) Germany has been chosen as the forum.
If there has been no express or implied choice, then ordinary conflict of
law principles apply and the contract will be governed by the law of the state
with which it has the closest connection.339 As the party with the
characteristic performance34 ° has the closest connection and it is the
arbitrator's actions and obligations that make the contract distinctive, the
habitual residence of the arbitrator is quite likely to determine the applicable
law.
Similarly, although different states employ different choice of law
analyses, under U.S. law, if there was no express or implied choice of law,
courts tend to focus on the place with the "most significant relationship."
Under the Second Restatement, courts will look for factors such as: (1) place
of contracting, (2) place of negotiation, (3) place ofperformance, (4) location
of the subject matter, (5) domicile of the parties, and (6) ease of the
determination of the applicable law. 341 Although the precise balancing to
find the most significant relationship will vary from case to case, two of the
strongest indicators are the place of the arbitration3 42 and domicile of the
arbitrator.343
From a policy perspective, it is particularly difficult to apply the law of
the arbitrator's domicile. In a multiple-member tribunal where most
arbitrators are probably from different countries, this creates great potential
variability. The application of different laws to the same contractual
relationship between the parties and the arbitrators would contravene the idea
338. See LEW, supra note 5, at 48.
339. See id. at 48-49.
340. See Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law
Applicable and Contractual Olbigations, 1980 0. J. (C 282) 20-21 (1980). The Giuliano &
Lagarde Report describe characteristic performance as an objective method for determining
the "closest connection" as performance refers to the functions which the legal relationship
involved fulfills. The payment of money is usually not the characteristic performance;
instead, it is "the performance for which the payment is due." For example, the
characteristic performance in a sale contract is that of the person delivering the goods and
for an agency contract it is the act of the agent.
341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 188.
342. Place of arbitration is important because it addresses where an arbitrator's allegedly
inappropriate conduct took place. See id.at cmt. e.
343. Domicile of the arbitrator is important as it addresses which law she might reasonably
expect to govern her behavior and whether she has conformed to those standards. See id.
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of uniform treatment of these contracts.344 This could result in unjustifiable
discrimination against arbitrators where they live in countries with higher
standards of liability. If the domicile is the applicable law, however, there
is a greater probability that the arbitrator will be familiar with the proper
standard of liability and act accordingly. Ultimately, this slight increase in
certainty does not justify the significant variations in arbitrator liability.
Particularly as it could result in variations among the behavior of arbitrators,
there could be unacceptable varying levels of arbitrator performance. For
example, within the same panel, U.S. arbitrators could covertly engage in
fraud without fear of repercussions while Saudi Arabian arbitrators adhered
to the strictest letter of the law. Although not all arbitrators behave in the
same way, this startling inconsistency in behavior significantly undermines
the respect for and integrity of the international arbitration process.
If, by contrast, immunity is determined by the place of arbitration, it will
be easier to ascertain. In one sense, it is the center of gravity of the
arbitration and closely connected with the conduct of the arbitrator because
significant activities occur there such as hearings and the making of the
award.34 Moreover, it allows for a readily ascertainable law which will
increase certainty, and assists arbitrators considering this factor in the course
of deciding whether to accept an appointment. Importantly, the application
of the place creates uniformity of result, where the same law will be applied,
and different arbitrators will not be attacked merely because they act
internationally but are domiciled in a country with high standards of liability.
Although lexfori alone should not be determinative, it must play a significant
role in a court's determination of the applicable law.346
Ultimately, however, the law applicable to an arbitrator's immunity will
depend upon: (1) a court's characterization of the issue, (2) the parties'
agreement, and (3) balancing of the competing interests.
344. See BERGER, supra note 12, at 234 n.235.
345. This may be less true, however, if the parties do not determine the place but instead
leave it to the choice of an institution.
346. However, there may be problems at the enforcement stage if there is a money
judgment against the arbitrator. See Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 44-45. It may be
possible to fail to enforce a judgment because it is against public policy. This is particularly
likely in the United States where individual states follow the Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Act, 13 UNIF. LAW. ANN. 417 (Master ed. 1980).
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V. PROPOSED SCOPE OF ARBITRATOR LIABILITY
In order to safeguard the integrity of the arbitration process, arbitrators
are entitled to some form of immunity. Because the precise scope of this
liability may be uncertain, arbitrators should try to provide themselves with
immunity through contract and should also consider expressly designating
the law applicable to the receptum arbitri. This can be done in one of two
ways: (1) by only accepting appointments from arbitral institutions which
have rules regarding arbitrator immunity, or (2) expressly making arbitral
acts immune in the receptum arbitri with both parties. Unfortunately,
arbitrators rarely obtain immunity in their appointment contract with the
parties. Instead, courts and legislatures of different nations address the issue
differently. At heart, the granting of immunity is a matter of public policy
that balances the social utility of immunity against the loss of being unable
to attack an allegedly wrongdoing defendant.
Unlimited liability is undesirable because of its potential impact upon
the integrity of the arbitration process. When disgruntled parties know that
arbitrators can be liable, it is reasonable to assume they could use
intimidation and subtle threats to influence the decision-making process.
Immunity provides arbitrators with a defensive shield that enables them to
come to principled decisions without fear of repercussions. In addition,
complete liability will spawn even more lawsuits, clog up courts, and present
losing parties with an opportunity to challenge the finality of the arbitral
process. As immunity is a deterrent for parties to sue, if immunity were
completely eradicated, there would be even more cases challenging awards
and arbitrator decisions. Since finality is one of the primary objectives of
arbitration, this result is clearly undesirable.
Absolute immunity, however, is also inappropriate. Cases finding
arbitrators are immune despite their flagrant and intentional misconduct are
wrongly decided. Although Mettler argues creating an exception for
fraudulent conduct would create a glut in lawsuits,347 this is not necessarily
true as even broad immunity is attacked. It would be better to recognize a
legitimate injury and bring countries like the United States into conformity
with international practice. Overly broad immunity fails to create an
incentive for arbitrators to be responsible for their actions, to the parties who
are paying the fees, or to the integrity of the international arbitration system.
Instead, with absolute immunity, arbitrators are completely protected if they
choose to abuse their discretion. This is particularly dangerous because,
347. See Mettler, supra note 101, at 28-29.
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unlike judges, review of arbitral awards is much narrower3 48 and abuses of
discretion are not necessarily checked by appellate courts.349 Moreover, there
is no professional association of arbitrators that can discipline arbitrators for
their inappropriate conduct.350
However, there may be informal methods for professional associations
to address the misconduct of arbitrators. China and Spain, in particular,
prevent arbitrators found guilty of reprehensible behavior from being
appointed in future cases.351 Similarly, in one unreported case in England,
Regina v. The Chartered Institute ofArbitrators Ex Parte Armstrong,3 52 an
arbitral institution was sued for trying to monitor an arbitrator who had
engaged in inappropriate conduct. In that case, although an arbitrator's
actions were not sufficient to be deemed "professional misconduct," because
of his failure to give adequate reasons in a written award, he was required to
348. See Sponseller, supra note 4, 423-24 (noting that when U.S. courts are faced with
an award, they will not review the merits of the controversy, the nature and sufficiency of the
evidence, the nature and credibility of the parties, the merits of the case, or the alleged errors
of law). In contrast, even agencies within the United States review issues of law de novo
although their factual determinations are subject to great deference. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
349. See generally Daniel M. Kolkey, Attaching Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and
Review in International Arbitrations, 22 INT'L L. 693 (1988) (describing the bases for
vacating arbitral awards in the U.S., France, Sweden, Switzerland and the narrow bases for
vacatur); see Ware, supra note 146, at 71 (stating that courts "do not ensure arbitrators apply
the law" and "even if a court discovers that an arbitral award does not apply the law, the
court will be unlikely to confirm the award"); see also New York Convention, supra note 3,
art. V (providing a discretionary basis for failing to recognize an award where (1) the
arbitration agreement was not valid under the applicable law or the law of the country where
it was made, (2) a party was not given proper notice of the arbitration or was unable to
present its case, (3) the dispute was not arbitrable or beyond the scope of the arbitration
agreement, (4) composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the arbitration
agreement or the law of the country where it took place, (5) the award has been set aside
elsewhere, (6) the award is not arbitrable under the country where enforcement is sought, or
(7) enforcement of the award is contrary to the public policy of the enforcement forum; but
see Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International
Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1679 n. 133 (1998) (noting that U.S.
courts appear to be creating a doctrine where awards that "manifestly disregard" the law
create a basis for non-recognition upon review but suggesting this violates the New York
Convention by creating an additional defense to enforcement).
350. Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 54-55.
351. See PETER SANDERS, National Report on Spain and National Report on China, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1998).
352. The actual decision was rendered on June 17, 1997, before Mr. Justice Owen of the
High Court of Justice in the Queen's Bench Division CO/1893/96. A copy of this decision
is on file with the New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law.
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submit all further awards to the institute.353 In essence, the institute
sanctioned the arbitrator by requiring him to get pre-approval of the award.354
The court held this was a legitimate action by the arbitral institution and
quashed the arbitrator's action for damages.355 In the absence, however, of
uniform regulation of the arbitral profession, liability for flagrant misconduct
is a viable method of preventing inappropriate behavior.
There are, however, some methods used to address this issue. Although
the model of China and Spain suggest removal from future cases is a
sufficient incentive to make arbitrators behave properly in their current cases,
not all countries have this standard. Moreover, it is somewhat questionable
that a mistake in one case justifies removal from all subsequent cases for the
duration of the arbitrator's career. There are, however, more informal
sanctions in the small community of international arbitration. In particular,
there is a sense of an unwritten agenda where arbitrators who are unpopular
for any number of: reasons will not be appointed by their colleagues.
However, because this method is largely informal, there is a significant
possibility for an abuse of discretion. It would be preferable to have a
professional association expressly regulating this issue rather than leaving it
to the discretion of private individuals.
Ultimately, if there is one common thread running through international
private law, it is that arbitrators should be liable, at the very least, for their
bad-faith and intentional misconduct. Within the international context,
harmonizing international arbitration law is of critical importance. Although
a compromise law splitting the proverbial baby is not desirable, it is crucial
to create arbitration law that recognizes international standards and avoids
appearing parochial, frightening off parties who are concerned about
arbitrating under unfamiliar standards, and making the place an undesirable
one within which to arbitrate. This is not necessarily to say that a country's
domestic arbitration law should be changed, but rather, within the
international setting, different rules are needed to recognize different
international realities.
Because absolute immunity and complete liability are thus untenable
options, qualified immunity is a more appropriate solution. The analogy to
"functional comparability" ofjudges is a helpful starting point. As in Stump,
arbitrators should be immune when they (1) perform functions normally done
by ajudge, and (2) when parties deal with the arbitrator in a decision-making
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capacity." 6 However, there are two situations in which this quasi-judicial
immunity should be limited.
First, arbitrators should be liable if they utterly fail to perform functions
that are essential to their appointment. As in Baar v. Tigerman,357 if an
arbitrator fails to render an award, such a decline to do the job for which he
was hired should result in liability. Since the entire purpose of arbitration is
to create a final decision, nonfeasance of this type is sufficiently fundamental
to render immunity inappropriate. Similarly, sufficiently long delay that is
not justified could also result in the loss of immunity.35 8 Many countries
recognize this as an express basis of liability or at least imply a duty through
their arbitration law. However, liability is only appropriate if the delay is so
long that it demonstrates that performance of an essential function is
unlikely. Courts should be cautious, however, in interpreting a missed
deadline as nonfeasance. Delay of this sort is something of which any
arbitrator might be guilty and does not mean that an arbitrator has completely
abandoned his mandate. Immunity should therefore extend to arbitrators
who are merely tardy.
Second, like the standards in England, Australia, Bermuda and
institutions like the AAA and WIPO, arbitrators should be liable for their
intentional misfeasance and bad-faith conduct. Although advocates of
absolute immunity correctly note that it is important to keep arbitrators from
being influenced by the mere threat of liability, this concern is outweighed
by two factors. First, there is an overriding concern for compensating injured
parties who have exhausted all other administrative alternatives and have no
other remedy.359 Second, there is an overarching need to monitor the
discretion of the arbitration profession to ensure that its members, at a
minimum, act in good faith and without intentional wrongdoing.
With the increase in number of arbitrations and the specialized
educational institutions designed to train arbitrators, arbitration is becoming
356. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
357. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
358. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 83, at 253.
359. Various commentators suggest that a successful appeal against an award should be
a necessary precondition for a suit against an arbitrator for inappropriate decision-making.
See BERGER, supra note 12, at 237 and Hausmaninger, supra note 8, at 46-49. Berger goes
on to argue that courts should be wary of actions where a party accuses an arbitrator of
misconduct but did not use remedies that were available to attack through the proper national
law. Ultimately, a party "has to be suspected of using the suit against the arbitrator as a
surrogate for the missed opportunity to have the award set aside. See BERGER, supra note
12, at 237. Where an arbitrator fails to act, however, this precondition is not an option, as
the failure to act will lead to the non-existence of the required award.
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a specialized professional service. It nearly amounts to "legalized fraud" to
provide immunity to an arbitrator who intentionally acts in bad faith.
360
Assuming that arbitrators are rational actors, excluding intentional
misconduct from immunity merely provides an incentive for arbitrators to act
in good faith. Ensuring that arbitrators do not abuse their power and act
fairly is a desirable goal for the parties, the arbitration community, and the
public at large.
Even strong advocates of arbitrator liability still note that "arbitrators
must be protected from harassment by litigation from disgruntled parties and
must be free to make decisions solely on the basis of the merits and their
independent judgment.
361
Before suing an arbitrator directly, however, parties should be required
to exhaust all other administrative remedies and ensure that they have not
waived their objections. 362 Therefore, I propose a model statute for adoption
by various countries in their international arbitration statutes. The statute
recognizes the desire for immunity in common law countries, but properly
balances this against the need of civil and Islamic law jurisdictions to address
the issue of bad-faith misconduct and concerns about the failure to perform
essential arbitration functions.
Proposed Statute: Qualified Immunity for International Arbitrators
Generally. International Arbitrators shall be immune from
civil liability to parties to the arbitration agreement for anything
done or omitted to be done in their capacity as arbitrators, except
as qualified in section (2).
Exceptions. (a) An arbitrator shall be liable if she/he
unjustifiably fails to render an arbitral award. (b) An arbitrator
shall be liable for bad-faith conduct done in his/her capacity as an
arbitrator. Bad-faith conduct may involve an intentional act that
is based upon, but not limited to, fraud or corruption.
360. See Okekeifere, supra note 184, at 135.
361. Yat-Sen Li, supra note 11, at 57.
362. Moreover, complaints of an arbitrators' misfeasance and nonfeasance maybe subject
to waiver. This is particularly true where the parties involved know of a reason for
complaint, such as a relationship between a party and an arbitrator, and fail to make a timely
complaint. See Leslie A. Glick, Bias, Fraud, Misconduct and Partiality of the Arbitrator, 22
ARB. J. 161, 169 (1967).
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Only a happy medium between the extremes of denying recovery in all
circumstances under an absolute immunity rule and opening up to limited
bases of liability will serve the general goal of fostering arbitration.
Ultimately, a balance must be struck between imposing sanctions on
arbitrators to deter them from wilfully or recklessly abusing their functions
and simultaneously making it possible for them to fulfill their quasi-judicial
role without fear of non-meritorious attacks. Overall, this proposed statute
recognizes the importance of making impartial decisions while avoiding
delay and moving the arbitration process forward for the benefit of all.
Moreover, creating a statute363 that addresses the concerns of countries and
parties within the international contract leads to international harmonization
and predictability within the commercial setting.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitrators currently have immunity from complaints regarding their
arbitral actions. The scope of this immunity largely depends upon the law of
the relevant jurisdiction and the applicable institutional rules. The United
States is the only country that has nearly absolute immunity for arbitral acts.
In contrast, most other countries have forms of qualified immunity while
others appear to have liability limited only by the terms of the receptum
arbitri and the applicable law.
Arbitrators should have qualified immunity. For nonfeasance, arbitrators
should only be liable when they have unjustifiably abandoned their arbitral
mandate. For affirmative misconduct, arbitrators should only be liable to an
injured party where they have engaged in bad-faith, intentional misconduct.
Ultimately, this qualified immunity strikes an appropriate balance between
the needs of international commercial actors, private arbitrators, and the
public.
363. In countries such as the United States, it might be necessary to include a provision
that expressly derogates the common law. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace
and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. and its Locals 656 and 985 v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 701 F.2d 1181 (6' Cir. 1983).
